Copyright © 2026 SumSet Tech LLC and the Universal Manifest contributors. This specification is available under the Apache License, Version 2.0. It is free and remains free. Earlier published revisions retain their original licence notices.
v0.5.0. Published as tag
v0.5.0ofUniversalManifest/universal-manifest, with the same wire files as release candidate 1 (v0.5.0-rc.1). Wire version0.5; namespacehttps://universalmanifest.net/ns/v0.5; reading routes/spec/v0.5/. It is a mechanism release, not a completed implementation or conformance qualification. Feature-specific PREVIEW and conditional requirements remain in force.
This is a companion profile to the Universal Manifest v0.5 Base specification. It specifies the Tier-2 cryptographic cross-DID binding profiles, the BBS+ selective-disclosure track that shares the same cryptography, and the post-quantum signature migration path. Read the Base and EXT-T1 first.
Status: All content in this profile is PREVIEW — under active review, built on the editors' recommended defaults, and fully revisable before the v0.5 schema is locked.
Companion to: Base
specification, building on EXT-T1.
Registry categories: trust,
signature.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC 2119] [RFC 8174] when, and only when, they appear in ALL CAPITALS, as shown here.
The Base defines Tier 2 — Cryptographic binding (Base §6.4.2) as the assurance
level at which cross-DID control is cryptographically proven via
zero-knowledge proof, without revealing private key material, and
reserves the bindingProof field on
identity.crossDidBinding claims (Base §6.4.4) and the
postQuantumSignature member (Base §6.7, Base §1.6.3). This profile
specifies:
bindingProof.These are bundled here for tier coherence: a deployment certifying to Tier-2 high assurance generally needs the ZK proof, the BBS+ selective-disclosure track, and a forward-crypto plan together. Tier-2 evaluators MUST also implement EXT-T1, since Tier 2 is strictly additive over Tier 1.
This profile provides cryptographic proof that the same entity
controls multiple DIDs without revealing private key material or linking
secrets. v0.5 provides two proof profiles for Tier 2 cross-DID binding.
Both use the bindingProof field on
identity.crossDidBinding claims.
Scope note — same-scheme key material. Both proof
profiles below assume the bound keys share a cryptographic scheme:
Profile 2A proves equality of a secret committed under BBS+ credentials,
and Profile 2B proves derivation of two keys from one seed under a
single derivation scheme. Neither covers cross-suite
binding — an Ed25519 key (Signature Profile A) and a P-256 key
(Signature Profile B, EXT-OPT §O15)
held by one subject on different devices. That case is served by
reciprocal cross-signatures, which work across suites:
each key signs a statement naming the other, and each signature is
verified under its own key's suite. Reciprocal control is already the
reciprocal-control holder-binding mode (EXT-T1 §T1.1); it proves control
of both keys without a zero-knowledge proof and without either key
learning the other's scheme. A cross-suite binding therefore carries no
bindingProof and is evaluated at Tier 1 as an
attester-asserted or reciprocally-proven claim, not at Tier 2 — the tier
reflects the proof mechanism, not the trustworthiness of the keys.
Cardinality. Both proof profiles are strictly
pairwise: one bindingProof proves control over exactly one
pair of DIDs. A claim that carries a bindingProof MUST
therefore list exactly 2 entries in
boundDids (Base §6.4.4), and the
proof binds to that pair in array order (Profile 2B's public inputs are
position-sensitive — T2.1.3).
Control of more than two DIDs is expressed as multiple
identity.crossDidBinding claims, each carrying its own
pairwise proof; since every such claim's boundDids includes
the manifest subject per Base §6.4.4, an N-DID
assertion is a star of pairwise claims around the subject. An evaluator
encountering a bindingProof on a claim whose
boundDids cardinality is not exactly 2 MUST treat the proof
as failing verification (recorded failed and capped at Tier
0, per T2.1.3); it MUST NOT
select a sub-pair to verify. (Wire note: the v0.5 candidate schema
applies maxItems: 2 conditionally when
bindingProof is present, alongside the existing
minItems: 2. Claims without a bindingProof,
including ceremony-only claims, keep the ≥ 2 cardinality. Structural
cardinality does not verify a proof.)
The holder possesses a secret s committed in the
credentials of both DIDs. The ZK proof demonstrates equality of
committed secrets across credentials without revealing s,
following the AnonCreds link-secret model adapted for Universal
Manifest. The two credentials are carried in (or resolvable from) the
claim's claimProof entries (Base §6.4.3); a Profile-2A
claim without resolvable credentials for both boundDids
fails verification. Evaluators MUST verify the BBS+ proof of equality
against the issuer's BLS12-381 G2 public keys for both credentials; the
proof inherently demonstrates that the presenter possesses the
holder-committed secret in both credentials.
A Profile 2A bindingProof MUST contain:
type — MUST be "ZkLinkedSecretProof".cryptosuite — MUST be "bbs-2023" per the
W3C Data Integrity BBS Cryptosuites.proofPurpose — MUST be
"authentication".proofValue — Base64url-encoded BBS+ derived proof
bytes.publicInputs — An object containing
commitmentA and commitmentB, the BBS+
commitments from each credential.BBS+ signatures ([BBS+]) are the RECOMMENDED cryptographic suite for privacy-preserving Tier 2 operations: BBS+ derived proofs do not repeat the issuer's signature across presentations, and selective disclosure is native to the signature scheme. Other carried values can still link presentations (Base §7.1).
Both DIDs are derived from a common master seed via hierarchical deterministic key derivation (BIP-32/SLIP-10). The ZK proof demonstrates that a master seed exists such that the two public keys are derivable at declared paths, without revealing the seed.
A Profile 2B bindingProof MUST contain:
type — MUST be "ZkHdDerivationProof".proofSystem — The ZK proof system used (e.g.,
"groth16"). Evaluators MUST support Groth16 [Groth16]; MAY support PLONK or Bulletproofs.circuit — URI identifying the HD derivation circuit
(e.g., "urn:uuid:circuit-hd-derivation-v1").proofValue — Base64url-encoded proof bytes.publicInputs — An object containing
publicKeyA, publicKeyB,
derivationPathA, and derivationPathB.Groth16 proofs require a per-circuit trusted setup ceremony. The ceremony parameters MUST be publicly auditable. Evaluators MUST verify against the trusted pinned circuit/version/key and public-input binding required by EXT-T1 §T1.6.2, including exact key bytes, integrity digest, proof system, input schema/order, and setup/trust evidence. A circuit URI or prover-supplied key does not establish that binding.
When an evaluator encounters an identity.crossDidBinding
claim carrying a bindingProof, it MUST apply the following
procedure (the declared requiredTrustTier governs what the
verified result must satisfy, not whether the proof is verified):
boundDids cardinality is exactly 2
(T2.1), and identify the
proof type from bindingProof.type.ZkLinkedSecretProof (Profile 2A): verify the BBS+
derived proof against the issuer's BLS12-381 G2 public keys referenced
in the claim's credentials, and confirm that the proof demonstrates
equality of the committed holder secret. Then bind the proof to
the claimed DIDs: confirm that each credential against which
the proof verifies resolves to a distinct member of
boundDids as its credential subject — together, the two
credential subjects MUST equal the boundDids pair. A proof
whose credential subjects do not match boundDids
demonstrates only that the presenter controls some pair of
credentials, not the claimed binding.ZkHdDerivationProof (Profile 2B): select the
already trusted, pinned circuit/version/key binding described in T2.1.2, require the
declared proof system and circuit to match it, construct the public
inputs in its specified schema and order, and verify the ZK proof. Do
not fetch or trust a key solely because the untrusted proof supplies a
circuit URI; an unknown or unavailable binding cannot grant a higher
tier. Then bind the public inputs to the claimed DIDs:
resolve each bound DID's DID document and confirm that
publicKeyA is a verification method of
boundDids[0] and publicKeyB is a verification
method of boundDids[1], respectively (listed in, or
referenced from a verification relationship of, that DID's DID
document). A bound DID whose DID document cannot be resolved fails this
check. The ZK proof alone demonstrates only that the two
declared keys derive from one master seed; the DID-document
check is what ties those keys to the DIDs the claim asserts are bound —
without it, a holder could present a valid proof over two keys it
controls while boundDids names arbitrary DIDs.boundDids, or a declared public
key that is not a verification method of its respective bound DID — MUST
cause the claim to be recorded as failed and treated at
Tier 0, regardless of any accompanying attestations; evaluators MAY
apply stricter local policy (for example, rejecting the manifest). Only
an absent bindingProof falls back to
attester-asserted Tier 1 evaluation.(Worked example: Tier 2 cross-DID binding with linked-secret proof — see Cookbook.)
Preview — built on default: This makes Groth16 the mandatory-to-implement proof system for Profile 2B (smallest proofs, fastest verification), with PLONK permitted as an optional alternative for deployments that prefer a universal setup. Input is requested on whether the trusted-setup cost of Groth16 justifies making PLONK the baseline instead. Flag to revise.
Universal Manifest supports selective disclosure at the manifest level through holder-controlled projection (Base §3.1.3), encrypted facets (Base §2.3), and credential-level disclosure inside claims. For credential-level selective disclosure, v0.5 defines two interoperable tracks so deployments can choose between web-native simplicity and fewer repeated proof values:
Manifest-level selective presentation composes with both tracks via facet projection, claim filtering, and pointer elision: the holder controls which facets, claims, and pointers appear in a given manifest instance, and Track A or Track B controls disclosure within a presented credential. Spatial-computing deployments, where the same subject may be observed across many venues, SHOULD use Track B to remove the repeated issuer signature. Track B alone does not prevent cross-platform correlation. Deployments otherwise default to Track A.
The privacy–binding tension is fundamental: stronger
binding enables correlation, while stronger privacy prevents binding
verification. The specification provides mechanisms for both and
requires evaluators to define their trust tier based on their threat
model. Evaluators MUST NOT require cross-DID binding unless their use
case demands Sybil resistance or trust transitivity; subjects SHOULD use
the minimum binding tier that satisfies their evaluators' requirements.
BBS+ pseudonym scope: if pseudonymScope is
reused across verifiers, cross-verifier correlation becomes possible;
issuers SHOULD generate unique scope URIs per verifier relationship, and
evaluators MUST NOT use a shared pseudonym scope for multiple
independent verifier relationships (EXT-T1 §T1.6.1).
Preview: The dual-track model is built on the editors' default (SD-JWT baseline; BBS+ for privacy-critical and Tier 2). Input is requested on whether Track B should be mandatory for any class of spatial-computing deployment.
Tier-2 privacy-preserving binding — the property
Track B is REQUIRED for (T2.0, T2.2) — is a
claimable conformance label, not a new mechanism. Its candidate
registered-profile identifier is
um:profile:trust:tier2-privacy-preserving-binding (a
trust-category profile per EXT-OPT §O6; the
identifier is provisional until registration). Following the thin
conformance-profile-label precedent of EXT-T1
§T1.3.3, the label names a bundle of existing requirements and
defines no new ceremony, cryptography, or member. A deployment conforms
to the label when, together:
boundDids binding steps of T2.1.3;The label is claimed in the deployment's conformance claim (EXT-OPT §O11.1, item 2 — implemented modules and claimed PREVIEW features); it adds no manifest wire member.
This profile defines a post-quantum signature profile providing quantum-resistant signing as a supplement to the baseline Ed25519 profile (Signature Profile A, Base §1.6).
The following NIST-standardized post-quantum signature algorithms are candidates:
For size accounting, the following are raw decoded lengths, before container encoding. ML-DSA values come from FIPS 204 Table 2; Ed25519 values come from RFC 8032 §7.
| Algorithm | Raw public key (bytes) | Signature (bytes) | Unpadded base64url public key (characters) | Unpadded base64url signature (characters) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ML-DSA-65 | 1952 | 3309 | 2603 | 4412 |
| ML-DSA-87 | 2592 | 4627 | 3456 | 6170 |
| Ed25519 | 32 | 64 | 43 | 86 |
These raw-key lengths do not specify a DER/SPKI carrier. The table provides size accounting and does not register ML-DSA-87 or settle the post-quantum carrier and verification parameters.
The post-quantum profile follows the signature-profile naming
convention of Base
§1.6. The recommended baseline post-quantum profile is JCS +
ML-DSA-65. “Signature Profile B” denotes JCS + ES256 under EXT-OPT O15; it
does not denote this post-quantum profile. JCS + ML-DSA-65 shares
Profile A's canonicalization: in a postQuantumSignature
object following this profile, canonicalization MUST be
"JCS-RFC8785" and algorithm MUST be
"ML-DSA-65"; the algorithm +
canonicalization pair identifies the profile, exactly as Base §1.6.5 requires for
signature, and an evaluator that processes
postQuantumSignature at all MUST apply the same
unsupported-pair rejection discipline to it. This naming correction does
not register a new suite, adopt a profile identifier, or settle the
candidate carrier and verification parameters.
The transition from Ed25519 to post-quantum signatures uses a
dual-signature period. During this period, manifests carry both an
Ed25519 signature (in the existing signature field) and a
post-quantum signature (in a new postQuantumSignature
field).
postQuantumSignature field.The postQuantumSignature field follows the same schema
as signature (Base §1.6) with the
algorithm field set to the post-quantum algorithm
identifier (e.g., "ML-DSA-65"). Both proofs are computed
over the same signing input: the canonical bytes of Base §1.6.3 with the
signature, postQuantumSignature, and (if
present) presentationProof properties removed, so that
neither signature's bytes feed the other's input.
(Worked example: dual-signature manifest — see Cookbook.)
Open questions: Whether the dual-signature mechanism should use a separate top-level field or an array of signature objects is open (separate field is simpler for backward compatibility; an array is more extensible). ML-DSA-65 signatures (3309 bytes) are significantly larger than Ed25519 (64 bytes); whether this size increase matters for constrained-device deployments is also open.
Cited in this profile (full descriptors in the published artifact):
bbs-2023).Companion to the Base specification. For the Tier-1 layer this builds on, see EXT-T1; for Tier-3 ceremonies, see EXT-T3.