Copyright © 2026 SumSet Tech LLC and the Universal Manifest contributors. This specification is available under the Apache License, Version 2.0. It is free and remains free. Earlier published revisions retain their original licence notices.
v0.5.0. Published as tag
v0.5.0ofUniversalManifest/universal-manifest, with the same wire files as release candidate 1 (v0.5.0-rc.1). Wire version0.5; namespacehttps://universalmanifest.net/ns/v0.5; reading routes/spec/v0.5/. It is a mechanism release, not a completed implementation or conformance qualification. Feature-specific PREVIEW and conditional requirements remain in force.
v0.5.0 inherits the accepted v0.4 editorial contract, adds a distinct wire/namespace identity and selects the stricter Profile A predicate. It is published and remains unqualified as a complete implementation. Migration and release notes distinguish old public bytes, inherited features and candidate changes.
Conformance in v0.5 is defined against the abstract data model, not against any single serialization. An implementation conforms by correctly handling the abstract properties and semantics of a manifest after consuming it through at least one production rule (Base Section 4.5).
Primary references:
/spec/v0.5/ is the generated reading view, starting with
the Base (Tier-0 / Tier-1 Core).spec/v0.5/README.mdspec/v0.2/SIGNATURE-PROFILE.md.v0.5 defines conformance for:
requiredTrustTier — a negotiated floor, distinct from the
effectiveTrustTier each party verifies and records in its
receipt.A conformance claim names the tiers and optional features it covers. The tier stack is additive: a Tier-1 claim implies Tier-0; Base + EXT-T1 is the Tier-1 surface; Base + EXT-T1 + EXT-T2 is the Tier-2 surface; and so on. Optional features (statusRef, bilateral sessions, federation, CBOR-LD, scope registry, and the rest of EXT-OPT) are claimed independently of tier.
Claims and reports MUST identify the implemented, partial, or not-implemented state of each claimed obligation, its exact source section, actual executed checks/evidence, finite limits, and the mandatory baseline for every unmet check, following EXT-OPT O11.1. A partial declaration does not waive a requirement or raise verification, assurance, or trust tier. Normative checks, structural PREVIEW checks, and unexecuted design-stage candidates remain distinct; a matching fixture verdict does not prove an unexecuted cryptographic primitive. This reporting rule creates no manifest member or wire capability carrier.
Bounded selective minimum disclosure is part of the v0.5 Base behavior. In plain language, each viewer, verifier, system, or use case receives only the minimum information it is allowed or needs to see. A v0.5 Base conformance claim covers this bounded profile through Stage 3 Project, Stage 4 Consent, sealed-entry handling, and structured receipts. It does not claim unlinkability, full or partial, cover-slot indistinguishability, resolver-operator privacy, or complete residual-fingerprint resistance. No v0.5 claim establishes them.
For the bounded selective-minimum-disclosure profile, the Project and Consent stages work together: the evaluator processes only the facets, claims, pointers, and device entries relevant to the viewer/verifier/system/use case and authorized by the interaction context; withheld facets are not projected and are not evidence of absence; and the receipt records the resulting per-facet outcome honestly.
An evaluator claiming v0.5 conformance MUST:
Deliberately offline/no-resolver evaluation records
keyRefResolution: "not-attempted"; failed/unavailable
attempted resolution records "unresolved"; authorized
matching resolution records "resolved".
Unattempted/unresolved keyRef-derived identity remains Tier0, and
embedded-key mathematics is not identity authority. Present but
unexecuted presentation proof verification records
"not-evaluated"; actual absence records
"absent". Required interactive proofs refuse on absence,
failure or non-evaluation. These are honest diagnostics, not adoption of
a signed-receipt mandate or additional evidence carrier.
keyRef ↔︎ publicKeySpkiB64 consistency
check. For wire 0.5 Profile A, MUST enforce all six
requirements of Base
§1.6.1.1; earlier-version compatibility paths retain their own
profile rules.27ab5a3cc491cee7a5947b73f550c07ecbff285a81a6ba801aa98f60046dcea4)
and verify its hash before trusting term definitions; an evaluator MUST
NOT dereference an arbitrary remote context at evaluation time. The
expected hash is the sha2-256 multihash
zQmR1W9vsPrdbXmhH38jdNhdEhBB1C7JUL1Z9kZMi6u16i7, computed
over the exact bytes of the versioned context document (verbatim body
and computation rule: Base Appendix B, EXT-OPT Section O1.7). See spec
text Section 6.10.@type (with um:Receipt),
manifestId, outcome,
signatureCheck, freshnessCheck, and
facetStatuses (empty array when the manifest contains zero
facets). See spec text Section 3.3.processed, opaque,
consent-denied, consent-missing,
trustTierUnsupported, assuranceInsufficient,
not-projected, or written
(assuranceInsufficient and written arise from
the assurance-floor and write-authorization PREVIEW features). See spec
text Section 3.3.1.consents[].facetRef against each projected
facet's @id. When no matching consent entry exists, record
consent-missing and MUST NOT process the facet's data.
Treat expired or withdrawn consents as absent. See spec text Section
1.4.4 and Section 3.1.4.holderBindingStatus: "failed" for a
failed binding, "absent" for a missing one). See spec text
Section 6.6 and EXT-T1.presentationProof whose challenge and
audience match the verifier-issued challenge; reject or cap
claims that fail this proof-of-possession. Of the three
proofType values, only did-auth is exercised
by the fixture suite and reference implementation today;
sd-jwt-kb and bbs-derived are at-risk (see
Section 9) and MUST fail closed when unimplemented. See EXT-T1 Section
T1.2.validUntil is
unknown regardless of attestedAt. See EXT-T1
Section T1.3.requiredTrustTier declarations at the manifest,
claim, and facet levels. Tier floors raise only - claim and facet floors
MUST NOT lower the manifest-level floor. See spec text Section
6.4.5.requiredLiveness floors: a facet carrying the floor MUST
NOT be processed unless a validated livenessAttestation
satisfies the requested minFreshness and, when required,
userVerified: true. An evaluator that does not implement
floor enforcement MUST fail closed: a floor-bearing facet is withheld,
never processed (Base Section 4.7). See EXT-T1 Section T1.3.1.requiredAssuranceClass floors: a facet below its required
class MUST be withheld, MUST NOT be downgraded, and MUST be recorded
assuranceInsufficient (the assuranceStatus
echo object SHOULD additionally be recorded). The same fail-closed
baseline applies to evaluators that do not implement floor enforcement.
See EXT-T1 Section T1.3.3.trustTierUnsupported in the receipt when the
required tier has no implemented verification profile (e.g., a Tier-2 or
Tier-3 requirement on a Tier-1 evaluator), and MUST NOT downgrade to a
lower tier.issuedAt/expiresAt comparisons SHOULD be no
more than 60 seconds; manifests with issuedAt more than 60
seconds in the future SHOULD be rejected with
freshnessCheck: "stale"; wider tolerances MUST be
documented in the conformance claim. See spec text Section 3.1.2.signature.statusRef is present and the evaluator
claims revocation-aware verification, resolve revocation status per the
statusRef resolution schema (Section 3.4) and record
revocationStatus. Evaluators not implementing
revocation-aware verification MUST report
revocationStatus: "unchecked" and MUST NOT claim
revocation-aware conformance.A holder claiming v0.5 conformance MUST:
manifestVersion: "0.5" and include the v0.5
versioned context https://universalmanifest.net/ns/v0.5 in
@context.@id (e.g.,
urn:uuid:<uuidv4>) per Section 1.2.2, and produce the
manifest through a conformant production rule.subject to a stable identifier URI (typically a
DID), and bound expiresAt to a sensible interaction
lifetime relative to issuedAt.signature.keyRef present and signature.value
populated over the canonical signing bytes. Signature Profile A
(signature.algorithm: "Ed25519",
signature.canonicalization: "JCS-RFC8785") remains the
default and the mandatory-to-implement evaluator baseline. A holder MAY
use Signature Profile B (signature.algorithm: "ES256",
signature.canonicalization: "JCS-RFC8785") when supported
by the intended evaluator, under EXT-OPT O15; its signature value is the
raw 64-byte R || S encoding. When evaluator support is
unknown, the holder uses Profile A or accepts fail-closed rejection; it
MUST NOT assume Profile B support or fall back to an unsigned
manifest.@id, @type: "um:Consent",
facetRef matching a facet's @id,
scope, purpose, grantedAt, and
expiresAt.encryptionProfile: "jwe-inline-v1" on the facet and supply
a conformant JWE JSON Serialization object as the entity
value, using an algorithm pair consistent with the JWE algorithm
constraints. See spec text Section 2.3.2 and Section 2.4.requiredLiveness and requiredAssuranceClass
values and the liveness/provenance evidence needed for the evaluator to
satisfy or refuse those floors. See EXT-T1 Section T1.3.holderBinding with a valid mode
(sd-jwt-kb, bbs-holder-commitment, or
reciprocal-control) and the fields that mode requires
(e.g., cnfThumbprint for sd-jwt-kb;
boundDid, subjectProof, and
boundDidProof for reciprocal-control). See
EXT-T1 Section T1.1.presentationProof containing proofType,
challenge, audience, created, and
proofValue. See EXT-T1 Section T1.2.bindingProof of a defined type
(ZkLinkedSecretProof or ZkHdDerivationProof)
with the fields that type requires. See EXT-T2 and spec text Section
6.4.7.ceremonyProof
(type: "ThresholdAttestationProof") with
threshold, attesters, ceremonyId,
and aggregateProof. See EXT-T3 and spec text Section
6.4.8.identity.crossDidBinding claims are issued,
populate all required fields (@type, issuer,
boundDids containing at least 2 DIDs) and, for
attester-asserted bindings, the attester triple (attester,
attestationMethod, attestedAt); the triple is
OPTIONAL when a cryptographic bindingProof or
ceremonyProof carries the binding. See spec text Section
6.4.4.um:agentDelegation pointers are issued, populate
all required fields (@type: "um:agentDelegation",
delegateType, delegatedBy matching the
manifest subject, delegatedAt,
expiresAt), using registered scope values where the scope
registry applies. See spec text Section 6.5 and EXT-OPT.A Conformant Bilateral Participant MUST implement both Evaluator Behaviour (Section 2) and Holder Behaviour (Section 3). In a bilateral exchange:
requiredTrustTier — a negotiated floor, distinct
from the effectiveTrustTier each party verifies and records
in its receipt.exchangeId and evaluatorId. The full session
object, paired-receipt correlation, and receipt hash-chaining are
specified in EXT-OPT Section O4.See spec text Section 4.3 and Section 6.4.6; EXT-OPT Section O4.
Dated finite TypeScript qualification (2026-10-21).
The candidate index, SHA-256
6334fe4f61198d087ddb8260ba467ba42507dfb852d2643d5de84619dc804e3b,
contains 188 cases, all matched by the actual command
adapter. The strict Draft 2020-12 schema/ingress sweep passed
192 checks (188 indexed inputs, three examples, one
targeted malformed-JWE control); the current API qualification passed
38 named groups, including the packaged-context
byte/hash check, corrupted-module rejection, trusted-context and
scoped-refusal controls, resolver-not-called behavior, dense-list
enforcement, opaque-data preservation and historical-version controls.
This evidence pins TypeScript source SHA-256
7f38f3480bda854ab66e75723fbeb2509768211f0aef85df9cad46ba1b54b29e,
built implementation SHA-256
e561f61d6308a87879880aaf08c81208abe2835007e9dcb9fd12f365d0e4094b,
bundled context-module source SHA-256
4ca50655a6bf28eb7f26cb16072a2cece498629fcdefde3533315bb4f988e7f8,
and built context module SHA-256
44f0748b9e64491f054d3f46816fc344ed7ac2b46fa4d933388564abef7774a1.
These implementation hashes identify the bounded reference; they are not
additional wire/context pins. All 164 earlier fixture bodies and every
original verdict, receipt expectation and caller context remain
unchanged, as does all supplemental JWE index data. The earlier
114-to-164 expansion added fifty signed
consent/time/operation/gate-order/trust-floor controls and clarified two
caller read contexts; this context repair does not change
those again. The 24 additional cases have independently valid outer
signatures: 11 accepted controls and 13 context refusals. Twelve
refusals are structurally valid; the empty-root-array refusal is
structurally invalid. Schema validity alone does not establish trusted
context interpretation. The separately dated 46/46 I-JSON checks
(2026-10-16) remain distinct from the changed evaluator's
current runs. The report deliberately returns
conformanceLevel: "none"; positive Tier-1+ verification,
authenticated services, other holder implementations and
protected/private mechanisms remain unproved. Reader and public-package
propagation require separate acceptance of these changed inputs.
Fixed offline reference context (implementation
limit). Before interpreting UM terms, the reference
implementation verifies the actual packaged normative UTF-8 context
bytes against the existing content hash. Its trusted reference forms are
the exact https://universalmanifest.net/ns/v0.5 scalar or a
nonempty dense list containing only that reference; repeated trusted
references are supported. In interpreted UM scopes, including the root,
facets, claims and consents, substitutions, inline remaps, resets and
arbitrary remote contexts refuse before signature execution or resolver
use. Refusal receipts report
signatureCheck: "not-evaluated",
freshnessCheck: "not-evaluated" and
keyRefResolution: "not-attempted". This is fixed offline
context support, not arbitrary JSON-LD expansion or remote loading, and
not a new restriction on the normative wire model. Entity data, embedded
credential/VP proof payloads and unknown-member payload contexts remain
byte-preserved, uninterpreted signed data; they confer no UM
interpretation, proof verification, identity or authority. A separate
selected profile or proof processor must establish its own semantics and
verification.
Receipt check assertions (2026-10-30). The candidate
index now asserts signatureCheck and
freshnessCheck on all 119 fixtures in evaluation mode, with
values derived from each fixture's bytes and evaluation clock. Its
SHA-256 is
940e23629c246596ef91c7ed7dc8f6fef6242fa6af3b287a2ba85555bc872a19.
The case count stays 188, and entries dated earlier describe the earlier
index. The TypeScript and Rust adapters each match 188 of 188. Rewriting
either field in a receipt now fails every fixture that asserts the
rewritten value.
Known limit on malformed created
(2026-10-30). A malformed signature.created fails
validation under the schema, and section 1.6.2 of the Base says so. The
current TypeScript and Rust evaluators do not yet agree with the schema
on every malformed value, so no claim may say they conform on those
values. A later package rebuild carries the correction.
Resource limits, consent entries and created
(2026-10-31). The candidate index adds eight signed cases and
now holds 196 cases, SHA-256
e8c72773514ddd0822c5b2b81f890ae9b557bad775309def1be70ed58b053434.
Six test the Base section 6.3 limits at each boundary, and two test more
than one consent entry on a facet. The TypeScript and Rust command
adapters each match 196 of 196, and 79 of 79 on the v0.4 index. Entries
dated earlier describe the earlier index. Both evaluators now apply the
schema's date-time rule to signature.created
on the v0.5 path, so the known limit above is corrected for the values
tested. The Base section 6.3 limits apply to the v0.5 path, and v0.4
keeps its own rules.
I-JSON ingress (2026-11-06). A fresh check found
that the TypeScript evaluator skipped the size limit when a manifest
could not be canonicalized, and accepted a 1.2 MB signed manifest with a
lone surrogate inside signature. The Rust evaluator
rejected it. Base section 1.6.3 now requires the whole manifest as
received to be I-JSON, including members outside the signing input. Both
evaluators now reject such input: Rust and the TypeScript ingress parser
at parse, and the TypeScript evaluator at Arrive with
um:reason:structure:malformed. The candidate index adds two
signed cases and now holds 198 cases, SHA-256
f3c812984f47f284a3254dc8d51b1cba8140a06ba41238f6bce3b7f8e4cdb97c.
The TypeScript and Rust command adapters each match 198 of 198, and 79
of 79 on the v0.4 index. The v0.5 schema sweep passes 202 checks.
Entries dated earlier describe the earlier index.
Known differences between the two reference evaluators (2026-11-06). These are outside the v0.5 suite, and both are documented deviations:
signature.created values with hour
24 and on a leap second outside 23:59 UTC. v0.4 is
published, so neither v0.4 path changes.Corrected evaluation boundaries (2026-10-21). The
earlier fifty controls exercise
grantedAt <= now < expiresAt, a caller-supplied
nonempty operation list whose every member is covered by consent,
malformed caller context/clock/ceiling refusal, and sealed-entry →
consent → assurance/liveness/trust-floor order. A configured trust
ceiling or successful key lookup does not create implemented Tier-1+
support; the current implementation's floor decisions use its actual
Tier-0 support. Mixed-facet cases and adjacent positives check the
resulting receipt and per-facet decisions. Matching purpose is necessary
at the purpose gate; omitted, empty and mismatching purposes produce
consent-denied / purpose-mismatch, while
malformed required consent purposes structurally reject before signature
verification. The two persisted encrypted-Entity cases retain valid
outer signatures and all four opaque facet rows in the actual command
run. Refusal evidence does not establish positive verification,
decryption or full conformance.
Detached cryptographic evidence (2026-10-16). The
TypeScript and Rust production Profile A predicates agreed with the
retained expectations on all 937 identical inputs (3 accept, 934
reject). This qualifies that finite signature-predicate
boundary only. It does not establish full evaluator or SDK parity. Four
accepted two-recipient ciphertexts containing two real JSON
um:Entity plaintexts remain unchanged in the two corpus
manifests signed for that qualification. Separate Rust/panva-jose calls
read those persisted signed files and passed 16 exact-plaintext
opens: 8 cross-implementation and 8 self-controls. TypeScript's
four opaque facet results establish sealed-entry handling, not
decryption. Earlier Entity evidence of 112 ordered wrong-key
refusals reaching unwrap (56 per consumer) and 24 tamper
refusals is reused because the ciphertexts, decryptors and
dependencies are exactly unchanged; those matrices were not rerun. The
older primitive experiment's 8 cross-opens, 36 wrong-key refusals and
156 malformed/tampered refusals remain a separate experiment. Neither
supplemental decryption calls nor reused negative controls add entries
to the current 188-case ordinary suite; primitive free-text payloads are
not conformant Entity fixtures.
The Rust JWE software subset's unsupported parameters and size/key limits are described as implementation limits in Base §2.4.2. They are not universal JOSE prohibitions. Successful authorized opens must precede ordered cross-facet key attempts, and lookup failures must remain distinct from unwrap/authentication failures (Base §2.3.5). Software evidence does not establish hardware custody, recipient authority, global entropy quality, or complete privacy guarantees. All 43 evaluator/holder/bilateral/suite obligations and conditional requirements remain in force.
To claim v0.5 conformance, an implementation MUST:
conformance/v0.5/expected.json.expectedResult; do not infer
expected behavior from the directory name alone.schemaValidation.expectedResult /
classification where present. The v0.5 ceremony shape
requires unique attester IDs; the evaluator additionally enforces
positive M,N and M ≤ distinct attesters ≤ N. A cross-DID
bindingProof permits exactly two boundDids; ceremony alone
may bind more. Valid structure does not verify an aggregate or choose
its protocol.Location: conformance/v0.5/valid/. The migrated index
retains evaluation-mode accepted-partial /
accepted-with-warnings outcomes and receipt-observable
statuses, including an assurance-floor reject and an explicitly routed
v0.3 envelope that the v0.5 schema rejects. The earlier fifty signed
controls also live here: valid signatures can accompany denied consent,
unsupported floors or malformed caller inputs. The new context cases add
11 accepted controls here and 13 refusals under invalid/;
all 24 have independently valid outer signatures. Context refusals
precede signature execution and resolver use, so compare the indexed
not-evaluated / not-attempted receipt states
rather than inferring verification from valid test signatures. Preserve
each indexed evaluationContext, including intentionally
omitted, empty or malformed values; never infer requested operations or
purpose from a grant. Compare all indexed assertions, including exact
ordered expectedBehavior.receipt.facetStatuses arrays for
mixed facets, rather than only the first row. The portable fixture guide describes
the full assertion contract. Directory placement alone is not an oracle;
use each indexed expected outcome:
minimal-signed-manifest.jsonld - baseline v0.5 signed
envelope (no facets, no claims) verifying under Signature Profile
A.minimal-es256-signed-manifest.jsonld - the same
baseline envelope verifying under Signature Profile B (JCS + ES256;
EXT-OPT Section O15). The Section 1.6.3 signing input is byte-identical
to Profile A - only the signature primitive differs - and
signature.value is the base64url of the 64-byte raw
R || S (EXT-OPT Section O15.1).es256-high-s-signature.jsonld - a genuine Profile B
signature whose S component is deliberately above
n/2 ("high-S"), which MUST be accepted.
Profile B imposes no low-S rule and no RFC 6979 requirement (EXT-OPT
Section O15.2): Secure Enclave / StrongBox / TPM signers expose no nonce
control and do not guarantee low-S, so a canonical-S rule would make
every hardware-resident key non-conformant. An evaluator that rejects
this fixture has added a malleability check the profile forbids.es256-signed-manifest-with-facets.jsonld - Profile B
over a body carrying facets and consents, showing the signing input is
suite-independent.manifest-with-holder-binding.jsonld - claim carrying a
holderBinding in sd-jwt-kb mode per EXT-T1
Section T1.1.manifest-with-bilateral-session-receipt.jsonld -
manifest with facets and consents suitable for bilateral session
evaluation.manifest-with-zkp-binding-proof.jsonld - claim carrying
a ZkLinkedSecretProof bindingProof per Section
6.4.7.manifest-with-ceremony-proof.jsonld - claim carrying a
ThresholdAttestationProof ceremonyProof per
Section 6.4.8 (transitional: predates the protocol member,
which is REQUIRED only at wire freeze - EXT-T3 Section T3.1).manifest-with-agent-delegation-scopes.jsonld -
um:agentDelegation pointer with core scope values per
Section 6.5.manifest-with-encrypted-facet.jsonld - facet using the
JWE inline profile (carried forward from v0.3).manifest-with-isolated-facets.jsonld - two encrypted
facets with distinct recipient kid values and distinct IVs
for the per-facet isolation smoke path.facet-required-liveness.jsonld - facet carrying a
well-formed requiredLiveness floor.consent-with-write-scope.jsonld - consent whose
scope includes a write operation for a target facet.receipt-facet-key-shredded.jsonld - receipt manifest
carrying facet-key-rotated /
facet-key-shredded lifecycle events.consent-unlock-window.jsonld - consent carrying
unlock.window scope and an enumerated unlock-window facet
set.facet-required-assurance-class.jsonld - locked facet
carrying requiredAssuranceClass: "hardware-bound" plus a
locked liveness floor.facet-assurance-hardware-uv.jsonld - facet carrying the
intermediate requiredAssuranceClass: "hardware-uv"
rung.facet-assurance-software.jsonld - facet carrying the
default/lowest requiredAssuranceClass: "software"
rung.manifest-locked-facet-below-floor.jsonld - structurally
valid manifest that MUST reject in evaluation mode with
assuranceInsufficient when presented with a software-class
unlock below a hardware-bound floor.manifest-with-unknown-members.jsonld - unknown root
members, an unknown entity field, and a devices array, all covered by a
genuine signature; an implementation that strips unknown members before
verification fails this fixture.manifest-with-bbs-holder-binding.jsonld -
bbs-holder-commitment holder binding carrying its required
commitment and proofValue plus an optional
pseudonymScope per EXT-T1 Section T1.1.1.manifest-with-reciprocal-holder-binding.jsonld -
reciprocal-control holder binding carrying its required
boundDid, subjectProof, and
boundDidProof per EXT-T1 Section T1.1.manifest-with-presentation-proof.jsonld - interactive
presentation with a genuine did-auth presentationProof per
EXT-T1 Section T1.2; the manifest signature excludes
presentationProof from the signing input, and
keyRefResolution: "unresolved" caps keyRef-derived identity
at Tier 0.manifest-with-liveness-attestation.jsonld - well-formed
livenessAttestation evaluated inside its validity window;
livenessStatus.freshnessClass records live per
EXT-T1 Section T1.3.liveness-attestation-past-valid-until.jsonld -
stale-liveness replay check: an attestation past its
validUntil classifies unknown regardless of
attestedAt and is never treated as current human
presence.agent-delegation-fail-closed-defaults.jsonld -
delegation with an empty scope (grants no capabilities) and
no delegateId (attributed to no agent); both fail-closed
defaults are receipt-observable warnings
(accepted-with-warnings).facet-without-consent.jsonld - facet with no governing
consent entry records consent-missing and is not processed
(accepted-partial).consent-expired.jsonld - expired consent treated as
absent: facet consent-denied with consent status
expired.consent-withdrawn.jsonld - withdrawn consent
(withdrawnAt set) treated as absent: facet
consent-denied with consent status
withdrawn.consent-scope-mismatch-read.jsonld - intended
read operation not literally present in the consent
scope: facet consent-denied with consent
status scope-mismatch.consent-unknown-condition.jsonld - consent condition
the evaluator cannot recognize or enforce fails closed: facet
consent-denied with consent status
condition-violated.encrypted-facet-sealed-entry.jsonld - encrypted facet
the evaluator cannot decrypt is acknowledged as a sealed entry
(opaque, outcome accepted-partial), never
rejected solely for being undecryptable.claim-unrecognized-type.jsonld - unrecognized claim
@type treated as unprocessable (present but unverifiable
above Tier 0) and recorded in claimStatuses.pointer-unrecognized-type.jsonld - unrecognized pointer
@type recorded as present (receipt
unprocessedEntries) and not acted on.claim-tier-cap-no-holder-binding.jsonld - claim relied
upon at Tier 1 with no holderBinding is capped at Tier 0:
holderBindingStatus: "absent",
effectiveTrustTier 0, claim recorded
trustTierUnsupported.claim-tier-unsupported-by-evaluator.jsonld - Tier-2
claim on a Tier-1 evaluator treated as unverifiable and recorded
trustTierUnsupported without downgrading
(accepted-partial).cross-did-binding-proof-only.jsonld -
identity.crossDidBinding carrying a cryptographic
bindingProof and no attester triple; the attester fields
are required only for attester-asserted bindings per Section 6.4.4.v03-backcompat-manifest.jsonld - v0.3 envelope
processed through the EXT-T1 Section T1.6.4 backwards-compatibility path
(absent binding statuses, tier capped at 0, unbound-claims
warning); the v0.5 structural schema rejects it while the evaluator
accepts it.Located under conformance/v0.5/invalid/:
holder-binding-invalid-mode.jsonld -
holderBinding.mode outside the enum (sd-jwt-kb
| bbs-holder-commitment |
reciprocal-control).holder-binding-missing-cnf.jsonld -
sd-jwt-kb mode without the required
cnfThumbprint.ceremony-proof-insufficient-attesters.jsonld -
ceremonyProof.attesters smaller than the M required by
threshold.binding-proof-invalid-type.jsonld -
bindingProof.type not ZkLinkedSecretProof or
ZkHdDerivationProof.missing-signature.jsonld - no signature
member.claim-tier-below-manifest-floor.jsonld -
claim.requiredTrustTier lower than
manifest.requiredTrustTier (Section 6.4.5; the floor raises
only).required-liveness-bad-minfreshness.jsonld -
requiredLiveness.minFreshness uses a value outside
live / recent / stale.required-liveness-not-object.jsonld -
requiredLiveness is not an object.facet-assurance-class-bad-enum-shape.jsonld -
requiredAssuranceClass uses a value outside
software / hardware-uv /
hardware-bound.facet-assurance-class-not-string-shape.jsonld -
requiredAssuranceClass is not a string enum value.bad-signature-value.jsonld - cryptographically wrong
signature.value (bit-flipped after signing); Ed25519
verification over the Section 1.6.3 signing input fails, while a
signature-presence-only implementation would accept.tampered-after-signing.jsonld - subject
mutated after signing, so the signature no longer covers the canonical
bytes.key-substitution-mismatch.jsonld - embedded
publicKeySpkiB64 substituted with a foreign key after
signing (the Section 1.6.4 key-substitution attack).expired-manifest.jsonld - evaluation clock past
expiresAt; the signature is genuine and only TTL math
rejects (freshnessCheck: "expired").issued-after-expires.jsonld - issuedAt
later than expiresAt (cross-field temporal misuse over a
genuine signature).future-issued-at.jsonld - issuedAt more
than 60 seconds in the future; rejected with
freshnessCheck: "stale" per Section 3.1.2.manifest-version-mismatch.jsonld -
manifestVersion: "0.6" is supported by no v0.5 processing
path (v0.3 envelopes instead take the EXT-T1 Section T1.6.4
backwards-compatibility path).unsupported-signature-profile.jsonld -
signature.algorithm: "ES384" is not a recognized suite, so
the (algorithm, canonicalization) pair names no registered
profile; rejected with
signatureCheck: "unsupported-profile" (Section
1.5.1/1.6.5). ES384 is a well-formed IANA/JOSE algorithm token that
Universal Manifest does not register, so the fixture exercises the
unknown-profile path and nothing else: the manifest carries a genuine
Ed25519 Profile A signature over a matching Ed25519 SPKI, and only the
suite token is unrecognized. Rejection MUST occur at the profile-pair
check, before any key or value inspection, and the pair MUST NOT be
reinterpreted as a recognized suite. The test is re-keyed off
"ES256", which became a recognized suite (Signature Profile
B) in v0.5; it remains unconditional because the schema
algorithm enum structurally rejects any token outside the
registered set.es256-bad-signature-value.jsonld - cryptographically
wrong Profile B signature.value (bit-flipped after
signing); ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 verification over the Section 1.6.3
signing input fails.es256-tampered-after-signing.jsonld -
subject mutated after Profile B signing, so the signature
no longer covers the canonical bytes.es256-key-substitution-mismatch.jsonld - embedded
publicKeySpkiB64 substituted with a foreign P-256 key after
signing (the Section 1.6.4 key-substitution attack); the suite and key
type are both correct, only the key is wrong.es256-der-encoded-signature-value.jsonld - a
cryptographically genuine Profile B signature encoded as 72-byte
DER/X9.62 instead of the mandated 64-byte raw R || S
(EXT-OPT Section O15.1); DER MUST be rejected. Because the profile pair
is recognized, the reason code is signatureCheck: "invalid"
(a malformed value under a recognized profile), not
"unsupported-profile".es256-spki-algorithm-mismatch.jsonld - an Ed25519 SPKI
declared under algorithm: "ES256"; the REQUIRED
SPKI-algorithm-vs-algorithm consistency check (EXT-OPT
Section O15.4) fails, in either direction. Reason code
signatureCheck: "invalid", not
"unsupported-profile".type-missing-um-manifest.jsonld - @type
does not include um:Manifest.context-wrong-namespace.jsonld - @context
carries a substituted namespace that cannot match the pinned v0.5
context document (Section 6.10 context substitution).holder-binding-reciprocal-missing-fields.jsonld -
reciprocal-control mode without subjectProof /
boundDidProof; rejected as a binding failure.holder-binding-bbs-missing-commitment.jsonld -
bbs-holder-commitment mode without its required
commitment field (EXT-T1 Section T1.1.1).presentation-proof-challenge-mismatch.jsonld -
presentationProof.challenge does not match the
verifier-issued nonce; replay-suspect, rejected for interactive
verification.presentation-proof-audience-mismatch.jsonld -
presentationProof.audience does not match this verifier;
rejected for interactive verification.presentation-proof-missing-when-challenged.jsonld - the
verifier issued a challenge and the manifest carries no
presentationProof;
presentationProofStatus: "absent", rejected for interactive
verification.liveness-missing-valid-until.jsonld -
livenessAttestation without its required
validUntil (EXT-T1 Section T1.3).agent-delegation-delegatedby-mismatch.jsonld -
um:agentDelegation whose delegatedBy does not
match the manifest subject (Section 6.5.1).agent-delegation-expired.jsonld -
um:agentDelegation past its expiresAt; expired
delegations are rejected (Section 6.5.1).encrypted-facet-malformed-jwe.jsonld - encrypted facet
whose JWE lacks iv and tag; structural
conformance requires all five JWE JSON Serialization fields (Section
2.3.2).facet-tier-below-manifest-floor.jsonld -
facet.requiredTrustTier lower than
manifest.requiredTrustTier (Section 6.4.5; the floor raises
only).v03-backcompat-tier-floor-unsatisfiable.jsonld - v0.3
envelope declaring a Tier-1 floor that cannot be satisfied at the
backwards-compatibility Tier-0 cap; rejected per Section 6.4.5 and
EXT-T1 Section T1.6.4.claim-proof-oversize-vp.jsonld - embedded
claimProof VP over the 50 KB per-VP limit (Section
6.4.3).missing-subject.jsonld - missing required
subject (Section 1.3.2).missing-expires-at.jsonld - missing required
expiresAt (Section 1.3.3).consent-missing-facet-ref.jsonld - consent entry
missing its required facetRef (Section 1.4.4).signature-keyref-without-embedded-key.jsonld -
keyRef resolution unavailable by construction and no
publicKeySpkiB64 embedded; the manifest cannot be verified
(Section 1.6.4 key-resolution ladder).The TypeScript command adapter executes the new signed corpus under
conformance/v0.5/expected.json. Valid Tier-2/3-shaped
objects are only structure controls: they do not establish aggregate
verification, attester authorization, holder identity or higher-tier
authority.
The direct JSON Schema contract is intentionally structural.
conformance/v0.5/expected.json is the normative fixture
matrix for schema sweep behavior:
invalid/holder-binding-invalid-mode.jsonld,
invalid/holder-binding-missing-cnf.jsonld,
invalid/binding-proof-invalid-type.jsonld,
invalid/missing-signature.jsonld,
invalid/required-liveness-bad-minfreshness.jsonld,
invalid/required-liveness-not-object.jsonld,
invalid/facet-assurance-class-bad-enum-shape.jsonld,
invalid/facet-assurance-class-not-string-shape.jsonld,
invalid/manifest-version-mismatch.jsonld,
invalid/unsupported-signature-profile.jsonld,
invalid/type-missing-um-manifest.jsonld,
invalid/context-wrong-namespace.jsonld,
invalid/holder-binding-reciprocal-missing-fields.jsonld,
invalid/holder-binding-bbs-missing-commitment.jsonld,
invalid/liveness-missing-valid-until.jsonld,
invalid/encrypted-facet-malformed-jwe.jsonld,
invalid/v03-backcompat-tier-floor-unsatisfiable.jsonld,
invalid/missing-subject.jsonld,
invalid/missing-expires-at.jsonld, and
invalid/consent-missing-facet-ref.jsonld.invalid/ceremony-proof-insufficient-attesters.jsonld,
invalid/claim-tier-below-manifest-floor.jsonld,
valid/manifest-locked-facet-below-floor.jsonld,
invalid/bad-signature-value.jsonld,
invalid/tampered-after-signing.jsonld,
invalid/key-substitution-mismatch.jsonld,
invalid/expired-manifest.jsonld,
invalid/issued-after-expires.jsonld,
invalid/future-issued-at.jsonld,
invalid/presentation-proof-challenge-mismatch.jsonld,
invalid/presentation-proof-audience-mismatch.jsonld,
invalid/presentation-proof-missing-when-challenged.jsonld,
invalid/agent-delegation-delegatedby-mismatch.jsonld,
invalid/agent-delegation-expired.jsonld,
invalid/facet-tier-below-manifest-floor.jsonld,
invalid/claim-proof-oversize-vp.jsonld,
invalid/signature-keyref-without-embedded-key.jsonld,
invalid/resource-limit-depth-11.jsonld,
invalid/resource-limit-array-1001.jsonld, and
invalid/resource-limit-size-1000001.jsonld.invalid/duplicate-member.jsonld,
invalid/escaped-duplicate-member.jsonld,
invalid/malformed-json.jsonld,
invalid/ijson-lone-surrogate-in-signature.jsonld, and
invalid/ijson-number-overflow-in-signature.jsonld.valid/v03-backcompat-manifest.jsonld fails the v0.5
structural schema (it is a v0.3 envelope) but is accepted by the
evaluator through the EXT-T1 Section T1.6.4 backwards-compatibility
path; its expected.json entry records both
expectations.Schema-only implementers MUST NOT claim full evaluator conformance
from a schema sweep alone. The dated TypeScript evidence separately
exercised structural/I-JSON ingress and focused API behavior. Those
development commands and adapter dependencies are not part of the public
specification package; external implementations consume the exact
versioned fixture index and portable contract. A green finite fixture
report is not full normative qualification and yields level
none for the candidate report described here.
These finite controls distinguish point/scalar acceptance, P15 structure/threshold limits, honest proof states and raw I-JSON ingress. They add no aggregate-verification or identity-authority claim. Their independent per-case outcomes and schema classifications are in the index.
invalid/ed25519-identity-a-r.jsonldinvalid/ed25519-noncanonical-a.jsonldinvalid/ed25519-noncanonical-r.jsonldinvalid/ed25519-signbit-zero-x-a.jsonldinvalid/ed25519-signbit-zero-x-r.jsonldinvalid/ed25519-s-plus-order.jsonldinvalid/ed25519-s-order.jsonldinvalid/ed25519-mixed-order-a.jsonldinvalid/ed25519-mixed-order-r.jsonldvalid/ed25519-ordinary-v05.jsonldinvalid/ceremony-zero-m.jsonldinvalid/ceremony-zero-n.jsonldinvalid/ceremony-m-above-n.jsonldinvalid/ceremony-more-attesters-than-n.jsonldinvalid/ceremony-duplicate-attesters.jsonldvalid/ceremony-three-dids-shape-only.jsonldinvalid/ceremony-shape-not-aggregate-verification.jsonldinvalid/binding-proof-three-dids.jsonldvalid/present-proof-not-evaluated.jsonldvalid/absent-proof-offline.jsonldinvalid/present-proof-unimplemented-interactive.jsonldinvalid/did-auth-invalid-point-signature.jsonldinvalid/duplicate-member.jsonldinvalid/escaped-duplicate-member.jsonldinvalid/malformed-json.jsonldvalid/escaped-member-without-duplicate.jsonldThese signed controls are in the candidate index, and the index holds each one's exact expectations. The text below is the index's own reason for each.
valid/purpose-request-matched.jsonld - Explicit caller
purpose matches the signed grant.valid/purpose-request-mismatched-withheld.jsonld - No
disclosure: caller purpose is different, omitted or empty; the envelope
remains accepted-partial.valid/purpose-request-omitted-withheld.jsonld - No
disclosure: caller purpose is different, omitted or empty; the envelope
remains accepted-partial.valid/purpose-request-empty-withheld.jsonld - No
disclosure: caller purpose is different, omitted or empty; the envelope
remains accepted-partial.invalid/consent-purpose-missing.jsonld - Malformed
required consent purpose is invalid, never an unrestricted grant.invalid/consent-purpose-nonstring.jsonld - Malformed
required consent purpose is invalid, never an unrestricted grant.invalid/consent-purpose-empty.jsonld - Malformed
required consent purpose is invalid, never an unrestricted grant.valid/encrypted-entity-rust-producer.jsonld - Fresh
signed envelope over exact independently encrypted JSON Entities; the
TypeScript evaluator records both facets opaque without decrypting.valid/encrypted-entity-jose-producer.jsonld - Fresh
signed envelope over exact independently encrypted JSON Entities; the
TypeScript evaluator records both facets opaque without decrypting.valid/consent-boundary-before-grant.jsonld - Signed
consent boundary before-grant: withhold the governed facet;
condition-violated.valid/consent-boundary-at-grant.jsonld - Signed consent
boundary at-grant: explicit active authorization.valid/consent-boundary-before-expiry.jsonld - Signed
consent boundary before-expiry: explicit active authorization.valid/consent-boundary-at-expiry.jsonld - Signed
consent boundary at-expiry: withhold the governed facet; expired.valid/consent-boundary-after-expiry.jsonld - Signed
consent boundary after-expiry: withhold the governed facet;
expired.valid/consent-boundary-scope-omitted.jsonld - Signed
consent boundary scope-omitted: withhold the governed facet;
scope-mismatch.valid/consent-boundary-scope-empty.jsonld - Signed
consent boundary scope-empty: withhold the governed facet;
scope-mismatch.valid/consent-boundary-scope-wrong.jsonld - Signed
consent boundary scope-wrong: withhold the governed facet;
scope-mismatch.valid/consent-boundary-scope-matching.jsonld - Signed
consent boundary scope-matching: explicit active authorization.valid/consent-boundary-multiple-operations-covered.jsonld
- Signed consent boundary multiple-operations-covered: explicit active
authorization.valid/consent-boundary-multiple-operations-partly-uncovered.jsonld
- Signed consent boundary multiple-operations-partly-uncovered: withhold
the governed facet; scope-mismatch.valid/consent-boundary-scope-null.jsonld - Signed
consent boundary scope-null: withhold the governed facet;
scope-mismatch.valid/consent-boundary-scope-string.jsonld - Signed
consent boundary scope-string: withhold the governed facet;
scope-mismatch.valid/consent-boundary-scope-object.jsonld - Signed
consent boundary scope-object: withhold the governed facet;
scope-mismatch.valid/consent-boundary-scope-nonstring-member.jsonld -
Signed consent boundary scope-nonstring-member: withhold the governed
facet; scope-mismatch.valid/consent-boundary-scope-empty-member.jsonld -
Signed consent boundary scope-empty-member: withhold the governed facet;
scope-mismatch.valid/consent-boundary-withdrawn-precedence.jsonld -
Signed consent boundary withdrawn-precedence: withhold the governed
facet; withdrawn.valid/consent-boundary-expired-precedence.jsonld -
Signed consent boundary expired-precedence: withhold the governed facet;
expired.valid/consent-boundary-not-yet-granted-precedence.jsonld
- Signed consent boundary not-yet-granted-precedence: withhold the
governed facet; condition-violated.valid/consent-boundary-unknown-condition-precedence.jsonld
- Signed consent boundary unknown-condition-precedence: withhold the
governed facet; condition-violated.valid/consent-boundary-purpose-matching.jsonld - Signed
consent boundary purpose-matching: explicit active authorization.valid/consent-boundary-purpose-mismatching.jsonld -
Signed consent boundary purpose-mismatching: withhold the governed
facet; purpose-mismatch.valid/facet-gate-missing-consent-before-assurance.jsonld
- Explicit signed facet-gate-missing-consent-before-assurance oracle:
accepted-partial; configured capability never establishes achieved
identity trust.valid/facet-gate-withdrawn-consent-before-assurance.jsonld
- Explicit signed facet-gate-withdrawn-consent-before-assurance oracle:
accepted-partial; configured capability never establishes achieved
identity trust.valid/facet-gate-scope-mismatch-before-assurance.jsonld
- Explicit signed facet-gate-scope-mismatch-before-assurance oracle:
accepted-partial; configured capability never establishes achieved
identity trust.valid/facet-gate-valid-consent-unmet-assurance.jsonld -
Explicit signed facet-gate-valid-consent-unmet-assurance oracle:
rejected; configured capability never establishes achieved identity
trust.valid/facet-gate-valid-consent-met-assurance.jsonld -
Explicit signed facet-gate-valid-consent-met-assurance oracle: accepted;
configured capability never establishes achieved identity trust.valid/facet-gate-sealed-before-assurance.jsonld -
Explicit signed facet-gate-sealed-before-assurance oracle:
accepted-partial; configured capability never establishes achieved
identity trust.valid/facet-gate-sealed-without-floor.jsonld - Explicit
signed facet-gate-sealed-without-floor oracle: accepted-partial;
configured capability never establishes achieved identity trust.valid/facet-gate-missing-consent-before-liveness.jsonld
- Explicit signed facet-gate-missing-consent-before-liveness oracle:
accepted-partial; configured capability never establishes achieved
identity trust.valid/facet-gate-valid-consent-unmet-liveness.jsonld -
Explicit signed facet-gate-valid-consent-unmet-liveness oracle:
rejected; configured capability never establishes achieved identity
trust.valid/trust-floor-manifest-0.jsonld - Explicit signed
trust-floor-manifest-0 oracle: accepted; configured capability never
establishes achieved identity trust.valid/trust-floor-manifest-1.jsonld - Explicit signed
trust-floor-manifest-1 oracle: rejected; configured capability never
establishes achieved identity trust.valid/trust-floor-manifest-2.jsonld - Explicit signed
trust-floor-manifest-2 oracle: rejected; configured capability never
establishes achieved identity trust.valid/trust-floor-manifest-3.jsonld - Explicit signed
trust-floor-manifest-3 oracle: rejected; configured capability never
establishes achieved identity trust.valid/trust-floor-facet-0.jsonld - Explicit signed
trust-floor-facet-0 oracle: accepted; configured capability never
establishes achieved identity trust.valid/trust-floor-facet-1.jsonld - Explicit signed
trust-floor-facet-1 oracle: accepted-partial; configured capability
never establishes achieved identity trust.valid/trust-floor-facet-2.jsonld - Explicit signed
trust-floor-facet-2 oracle: accepted-partial; configured capability
never establishes achieved identity trust.valid/trust-floor-facet-3.jsonld - Explicit signed
trust-floor-facet-3 oracle: accepted-partial; configured capability
never establishes achieved identity trust.valid/trust-floor-mixed-1.jsonld - Explicit signed
trust-floor-mixed-1 oracle: accepted-partial; configured capability
never establishes achieved identity trust.valid/trust-floor-claim-1.jsonld - Explicit signed
trust-floor-claim-1 oracle: accepted-partial; configured capability
never establishes achieved identity trust.valid/trust-floor-mixed-2.jsonld - Explicit signed
trust-floor-mixed-2 oracle: accepted-partial; configured capability
never establishes achieved identity trust.valid/trust-floor-claim-2.jsonld - Explicit signed
trust-floor-claim-2 oracle: accepted-partial; configured capability
never establishes achieved identity trust.valid/trust-floor-mixed-3.jsonld - Explicit signed
trust-floor-mixed-3 oracle: accepted-partial; configured capability
never establishes achieved identity trust.valid/trust-floor-claim-3.jsonld - Explicit signed
trust-floor-claim-3 oracle: accepted-partial; configured capability
never establishes achieved identity trust.valid/trust-floor-malformed-ceiling-string.jsonld -
Explicit signed trust-floor-malformed-ceiling-string oracle: rejected;
configured capability never establishes achieved identity trust.valid/trust-floor-malformed-ceiling-null.jsonld -
Explicit signed trust-floor-malformed-ceiling-null oracle: rejected;
configured capability never establishes achieved identity trust.valid/trust-floor-malformed-ceiling-too-high.jsonld -
Explicit signed trust-floor-malformed-ceiling-too-high oracle: rejected;
configured capability never establishes achieved identity trust.valid/trust-floor-malformed-ceiling-negative.jsonld -
Explicit signed trust-floor-malformed-ceiling-negative oracle: rejected;
configured capability never establishes achieved identity trust.valid/trust-floor-malformed-ceiling-fractional.jsonld -
Explicit signed trust-floor-malformed-ceiling-fractional oracle:
rejected; configured capability never establishes achieved identity
trust.valid/context-integrity-root-pinned-scalar.jsonld -
Accept only pinned interpreted scopes; literal/unknown JSON is preserved
without context authority.valid/context-integrity-root-pinned-array.jsonld -
Accept only pinned interpreted scopes; literal/unknown JSON is preserved
without context authority.valid/context-integrity-root-pinned-repeated-array.jsonld
- Accept only pinned interpreted scopes; literal/unknown JSON is
preserved without context authority.invalid/context-integrity-root-empty-array.jsonld -
Reject context substitution before interpreting UM fields; the
independently valid outer signature is not executed by evaluation.invalid/context-integrity-root-reset-after-pinned.jsonld
- Reject context substitution before interpreting UM fields; the
independently valid outer signature is not executed by evaluation.invalid/context-integrity-root-prefix-substitution.jsonld
- Reject context substitution before interpreting UM fields; the
independently valid outer signature is not executed by evaluation.invalid/context-integrity-root-remote-after-pinned.jsonld
- Reject context substitution before interpreting UM fields; the
independently valid outer signature is not executed by evaluation.valid/context-integrity-facet-pinned-scalar.jsonld -
Accept only pinned interpreted scopes; literal/unknown JSON is preserved
without context authority.valid/context-integrity-facet-pinned-array.jsonld -
Accept only pinned interpreted scopes; literal/unknown JSON is preserved
without context authority.invalid/context-integrity-facet-reset.jsonld - Reject
context substitution before interpreting UM fields; the independently
valid outer signature is not executed by evaluation.invalid/context-integrity-facet-prefix-substitution.jsonld
- Reject context substitution before interpreting UM fields; the
independently valid outer signature is not executed by evaluation.invalid/context-integrity-facet-remote.jsonld - Reject
context substitution before interpreting UM fields; the independently
valid outer signature is not executed by evaluation.valid/context-integrity-claim-pinned-scalar.jsonld -
Accept only pinned interpreted scopes; literal/unknown JSON is preserved
without context authority.valid/context-integrity-claim-pinned-array.jsonld -
Accept only pinned interpreted scopes; literal/unknown JSON is preserved
without context authority.invalid/context-integrity-claim-reset.jsonld - Reject
context substitution before interpreting UM fields; the independently
valid outer signature is not executed by evaluation.invalid/context-integrity-claim-prefix-substitution.jsonld
- Reject context substitution before interpreting UM fields; the
independently valid outer signature is not executed by evaluation.invalid/context-integrity-claim-remote.jsonld - Reject
context substitution before interpreting UM fields; the independently
valid outer signature is not executed by evaluation.valid/context-integrity-consent-pinned-scalar.jsonld -
Accept only pinned interpreted scopes; literal/unknown JSON is preserved
without context authority.valid/context-integrity-consent-pinned-array.jsonld -
Accept only pinned interpreted scopes; literal/unknown JSON is preserved
without context authority.invalid/context-integrity-consent-reset.jsonld - Reject
context substitution before interpreting UM fields; the independently
valid outer signature is not executed by evaluation.invalid/context-integrity-consent-prefix-substitution.jsonld
- Reject context substitution before interpreting UM fields; the
independently valid outer signature is not executed by evaluation.invalid/context-integrity-consent-remote.jsonld -
Reject context substitution before interpreting UM fields; the
independently valid outer signature is not executed by evaluation.valid/context-integrity-literal-entity-preserved.jsonld
- Accept only pinned interpreted scopes; literal/unknown JSON is
preserved without context authority.valid/context-integrity-unknown-member-preserved.jsonld
- Accept only pinned interpreted scopes; literal/unknown JSON is
preserved without context authority.valid/resource-limit-depth-10.jsonld - Nesting of
exactly 10 levels, counting containers with the manifest object as level
1, is within the Base Section 6.3 default.invalid/resource-limit-depth-11.jsonld - Validly signed
nesting of 11 levels exceeds the Base Section 6.3 default and refuses at
Arrive, before the signature check.valid/resource-limit-array-1000.jsonld - An array of
exactly 1,000 entries is within the Base Section 6.3 default.invalid/resource-limit-array-1001.jsonld - A validly
signed array of 1,001 entries exceeds the Base Section 6.3 default and
refuses at Arrive, before the signature check.valid/resource-limit-size-1000000.jsonld - Exactly
1,000,000 octets over the JCS-canonical form is within the Base Section
6.3 default.invalid/resource-limit-size-1000001.jsonld - A validly
signed 1,000,001 octets over the JCS-canonical form exceeds the Base
Section 6.3 default and refuses at Arrive, before the signature
check.valid/consent-two-entries-both-satisfied.jsonld - Two
consent entries on one facet, both satisfied: the facet is
processed.valid/consent-two-entries-one-purpose-mismatch.jsonld -
Two consent entries on one facet, one satisfied and one with a purpose
mismatch: the facet is consent-denied.invalid/ijson-lone-surrogate-in-signature.jsonld - A
validly signed manifest with a lone surrogate inside
signature, outside the signing input, is not I-JSON and
refuses at ingress.invalid/ijson-number-overflow-in-signature.jsonld - A
validly signed manifest with a number outside the IEEE 754 double range
inside signature, outside the signing input, is not I-JSON
and refuses at ingress.v0.5 conformance verification MUST include rejection tests for the v0.2/v0.3 baseline cases (signature spoofing, signature misuse, temporal misuse, manifest-version mismatch) plus v0.5-specific cases:
mode, MUST
NOT be treated as Tier 1; it caps at Tier 0. See EXT-T1.sd-jwt-kb
without cnfThumbprint, or reciprocal-control
without boundDid / subjectProof /
boundDidProof, MUST be rejected as a binding failure.requiredTrustTier
than the manifest-level floor MUST be rejected (the floor raises only,
Section 6.4.5).bindingProof with a type outside the defined
set, or a ceremonyProof whose attesters count
is below the threshold, MUST be rejected.livenessAttestation past its validUntil, or an
interactive presentation whose presentationProof
challenge/audience does not match the verifier's, MUST NOT be accepted
as current human presence.protected, recipients, iv,
ciphertext, tag).um:agentDelegation with delegatedBy not
matching the manifest subject, and expired
delegation (expiresAt in the past), MUST be
rejected. See Section 6.5.For implementation-neutral, external conformance execution, use the standalone suite documentation:
conformance/README.mdconformance/v0.5/conformance/v0.5/expected.jsonThe standalone suite is language-neutral and encoding-neutral: it packages fixtures plus expected outcomes so implementations can prove equivalent v0.5 verification behaviour across runtimes and across conformant production rules.
For a purpose-bearing evaluation case, the harness MUST pass the
case's explicit caller purpose from
evaluationContext.intendedPurpose when supplied. It MUST
preserve omitted or empty caller-purpose controls as such and MUST NOT
derive the caller's purpose from consents[].purpose or
other grant data. Fixture context is test input outside the signed
manifest; these instructions introduce no request carrier or manifest
member.
Only entries in the index's fixtures array define the
ordinary finite suite. Supplemental
jweInteroperabilityVectors, when present at the index root,
is separate test evidence: honor its public-test-only key warning,
consume and report its specified decryption controls separately, and
never use disposable private test keys for real data or put them into
manifest wire fields. TypeScript sealed-entry assertions do not prove
that decryption ran; supplemental results do not establish full
conformance.
The separately maintained TypeScript and Rust reference evaluators are two possible implementations. This public specification package excludes their development runners. The dated evidence below has the limits described in Section 5; it does not establish full conformance.
Offline signing-key resolution (2026-10-26). Both
v0.5 evaluators offer optional offline did:key resolution
for Ed25519 and P-256. The offlineKeyResolution context
option requires a boolean; absent or false preserves
existing behavior. Rust's typed context names it
offline_key_resolution. TypeScript rejects
true combined with a resolveKeyRef callback;
that application hook remains available when offline mode is absent or
false. Legacy v0.4 and standalone assertion helpers retain
their defaults.
The bounded resolver accepts canonical base58btc (z) or
unpadded base64url (u), canonical multicodec varints and
valid key points. It selects the bare DID or its exact
#<same-multibase> signing method. Queries, paths,
foreign fragments, unsupported curves and malformed encodings do not
resolve.
A resolved key can verify without an embedded key. When both are present, their decoded SPKI bytes must match exactly. The evaluator refuses substitution.
Failed or unavailable resolution may fall back to an embedded key and
reports unresolved; without an embedded key, verification
refuses. If no lookup occurs, the receipt reports
not-attempted. Resolution makes no network request.
Declared-suite and signature checks still apply, and root
did-auth remains Ed25519-only.
SD-JWT holder binding (2026-10-26). The reference helpers perform separate, bounded issuer-signature and holder-binding mathematics using caller-authenticated issuer and holder role keys. They check the binding's signature, audience, challenge, time and presentation hash.
These checks do not establish complete subject or issuer
authorization, consent, revocation status or claim identity. Root
sd-jwt-kb remains a refused PREVIEW presentation-proof
mode. Neither key resolution nor holder binding elevates claim or
effective identity trust above Tier 0. The implementations provide no
aggregate or Tier-2/3 verifier. All 43 obligations remain applicable;
full conformance remains unevaluated.
Dated qualification (2026-10-26). The original TypeScript holder-binding acceptance covered 18 controls. Rust acceptance covered 43 controls, including 23 inputs shared with TypeScript. Subsequent resolver acceptance covered 108 fresh signed inputs in each runtime, including four SD-JWT composition cases.
Rust 1.85.0 separately built the unchanged locked
um-core library on macOS arm64. The two focused resolver
and holder-binding targets passed 12 tests. Two shared-input tests
remained ignored. That compiler result covers only this library build
and those targets. It does not qualify other platforms, packages or
consumers. The historical corpus, ABI and bilateral results below remain
bound to their original dates and artifact hashes; they are not fresh
executions against later binaries.
Rust evaluator phase one (2026-10-21). Explicit APIs
include assert_structural_v05,
verify_manifest_v05,
assert_manifest_v05_fresh,
evaluate_manifest_v05,
crypto::verify_manifest_signature_v05 and
EvaluationContext::from_json_v05. The existing versioned
generator supplies additive model_v05,
schema_v05 and pins::v05 from the frozen
schema/context; unqualified v0.4 models, pins and defaults remain.
Shared parsing, JCS, profile selection and evaluator stages require a
finite caller-pinned clock, check the actual pinned offline context
before cryptography, use strict Profile A verification, retain Profile B
raw-64/high-S behavior, enforce explicit purpose and fully covered
operation scope, and order sealed entry → consent → floors. Achieved
trust remains capped at Tier 0; unsupported proof/authority paths fail
closed or retain honest unevaluated states. Sealed facets are not
decrypted by the evaluator.
The phase-one command adapter matched 188/188 unchanged indexed cases, including 119 cases with strict receipt assertions; its server passed 25 HTTP controls, with 12 independent command controls. The phase-one suites passed 420 core, 22 adapter and 7 generator tests. Those results identify the phase-one adapter/server below; they are not a complete-corpus rerun against later binaries.
Local bilateral execution (2026-10-21). Selected
version 0.5 reaches both counterparty evaluations and the
existing durable session contract. The explicit receipt/challenge
helpers use the same v0.5 strict wire predicate for action, challenge
and receipt boundaries. Two persistent Swift callers commit all five
operations in each positive encounter, verify actual evaluator and
receipt digests and reciprocal acknowledgments, and refuse version
changes after restart. Channels are locally injected evidence, not
authenticated peer identity or physical radio observations.
Independently installed role keys authenticate the tested signed bodies
only within that local test contract.
The preserved bilateral predecessor passed the 52-control online caller suite for each of v0.4 and v0.5, including eight completed encounters per version. The observation union covers 78 v0.5 cases per command/HTTP transport and 76 v0.4 cases per transport; retained failed runs received only named version-specific expectation corrections and focused failed-subcase reruns, without changing evaluator semantics or weakening expected behavior. 422 core and 22 adapter tests passed before the final narrow implicit-v0.4 fallback correction. After that correction, one focused adapter test, two old/new byte-equal legacy comparisons and four byte-equal witness comparisons passed. The final successor then passed all eight positive v0.5 encounters, one v0.4 encounter and eight actual HTTP responses. Fresh independent command/HTTP controls cover changed-version restart, opposite-version manifests and strict action/challenge/receipt boundaries. These focused successor results do not transfer the predecessor's complete fault matrix to another binary.
Independent causal inspection of four retained caller runs plus a fresh final-binary run traced 270 action/delivery/persistence links and 54 verified signed receipts across 27 completed encounters. Both evaluator digests match the receipt bodies, whose signatures verify with independently installed role keys. The fresh run adds two mixed-suite positives and a signed-body tamper refusal. The totals describe distinct scoped observations, not a single new matrix or a certification grade.
| Executed binary scope | SHA-256 |
|---|---|
| Phase-one adapter: complete 188-case corpus | 3abdbac5be2851f8c1b84ca0c7afb7e7226938cfbe8f55c7bea8b77a744cbd18 |
| Phase-one server: 25 HTTP controls | 8e79763fad2fedae3203d0957417cb87e388dfadcd60c716f5ae5b8add5e5e0e |
| Bilateral predecessor adapter: full online suite | f5d29ef0a93719c9934c699d595d7b1ae12dffadbdeefab46b63fd17c1930a3f |
| Bilateral predecessor server | 0052b4c54ae0d24ca19a39c2624f55334b45856523ac100edd26b48bb61a8a84 |
| Final successor adapter: focused compatibility/caller controls | 00545a2347c7f8ffb3f6a9c7499813005c97ac4798d11dcd8015ef5b31b7fe34 |
| Final successor server: eight HTTP responses and focused controls | 24c9a38c2a1dd668882838b565da5027c5071c7ac54182a71511d4ee7ff4f847 |
| Swift caller and identical actor executable | 67e1b8c11589bb7345b1aafa96174df005b1fb1b8194b690d9dcb33dc2c42849 |
| Unchanged FFI signing/prerequisite library | 22c302bda3f544533fb19036b231c328ab0c02d55db302b61ed409ddca4fbb8d |
These are implementation-evidence identities, not wire pins or public
package dependencies. The old FFI signing library is not a newly
qualified v0.5 ABI evaluator. Local software execution does not
establish holder generation, peer identity, real radio, source
permission or withdrawal, authenticated services, protected adoption,
physical/device behavior, whole-SDK parity or complete Standard
conformance. All 43 obligations and unmet baselines remain in force;
conformance stays none. The separately dated TypeScript
188/192/38, 46 I-JSON, 937-signature and 16-JWE results retain their own
scopes and were not rerun for this documentation refresh.
Third-party adopters do not need Node/TypeScript; the fixtures are designed to be portable. You can build a conformant harness in any language and over any conformant encoding.
Several v0.5 capabilities are built into the draft on the editors' recommended defaults and are marked PREVIEW - under active review and revisable before the schema locks. The Base defines the candidate Tier-0 / Tier-1 surface; this source change does not establish new-version runtime interoperability or completion of its requirements. PREVIEW comes in two grades (the "two-grade PREVIEW policy" cited from Base Section 4.4): Grade-1 (structural) PREVIEW - members already on the wire (context term + shape fixtures) whose enforcement semantics remain revisable. Grade-2 (design-stage) PREVIEW - candidate members not yet in the schema/context/fixtures at all. PREVIEW surfaces include:
sd-jwt-kb and
bbs-derived (EXT-T1 Section T1.2) -
at-risk / specification-only. Of the three
presentationProof.proofType values, only
did-auth was exercised by the earlier v0.4 fixture suite
and the reference implementation; sd-jwt-kb (whose manifest
binding depends on the unratified decision UM-v04-DEC-07) and
bbs-derived have no fixtures and no implementation, so
interoperability for the two is not yet demonstrable. An implementation
MUST fail them closed rather than report an unverified proof as
verified, and a conformance claim relying on interactive presentation
SHOULD state which proofType it implements. Both stay at
risk in v0.5: UM-v04-DEC-07 is not ratified, and its ratification and
the fixtures are later-version work.trustWeight
(EXT-OPT Section O8) is specification-only in v0.5: its term
was removed from the frozen context at the 2026-07-15 schema lock
because no fixture, example, or worked example exercises it and its
value shape (closed enum versus extensible vocabulary) is an open
question. The O8 semantics stand as specified — including that an
evaluator encountering the deprecated interpretedAs MUST
ignore it and default to "hint" - but the member has no
v0.5 context term and so is not carried losslessly on the v0.5 wire; it
re-enters the context with fixture and schema coverage once the
value-shape question is settled (Base Appendix B.1).One boundary note that is not itself a PREVIEW surface: selective minimum disclosure is production-candidate Base behavior (Sections 1 and 2 above), claimed only in its bounded v0.5 form — projection-scoped disclosure, consent gating, sealed-entry handling, and receipt evidence. What remains open is the deeper high-privacy per-target chain: unlinkability, full or partial, cover-slot indistinguishability, resolver-operator privacy, and residual-fingerprint measurement. Do not infer those guarantees from a Base conformance claim.
A v0.5 conformance claim shows the mechanism, with reference suppliers where a supplier is needed. It shows no real-world identity, issuer or revocation result. The release boundary states the limit for first contact, issuer authority and status.
A second boundary note of the same kind: carrying an external-standard artifact (for example C2PA content-credential material, an OGC GeoPose payload, or a W3C Verifiable Credential) inside or by reference from a manifest does not extend a v0.5 conformance claim to that artifact. The carried standard verifies under its own rules, independently of the UM envelope evaluation, and a v0.5 receipt records the UM envelope outcome — not the carried standard's verdict. Absent a registered carry profile, an evaluator that cannot evaluate a carried standard preserves it (sealed/opaque or unprocessed, per the fail-closed baselines above) and does not report it as verified. A dedicated carried-standard verification-result field and an unknown-carried-standard disposition value are future registered-profile work, not Base members.
A conformance claim SHOULD state which PREVIEW features, if any, it implements, since their wire shape may still change.