v0.5.0. Published as tag v0.5.0 of UniversalManifest/universal-manifest, with the same wire files as release candidate 1 (v0.5.0-rc.1). It is a mechanism release, not a completed implementation or conformance qualification. Canonical source: UniversalManifest GitHub. Earlier versions were reviewed in the OMA3 Technical Working Group, and publication asserts no OMA3 ratification.
Download all pages (ZIP) Markdown PDF

Universal Manifest v0.5 — Conformance

Implementation requirements

v0.5.0. Published as tag v0.5.0 of UniversalManifest/universal-manifest, with the same wire files as release candidate 1 (v0.5.0-rc.1). It is a mechanism release, not a completed implementation or conformance qualification. Immutable versions in UniversalManifest/universal-manifest are normative; main is the working version. Earlier versions were reviewed in the OMA3 Technical Working Group, and publication asserts no OMA3 ratification.

This document:
/spec/v0.5/conformance/
Document set:
Universal Manifest v0.5.0 · What changed in v0.5.0
Artifacts:
JSON Schema · JSON-LD context
History:
https://universalmanifest.net/spec/ (version index and changelog)
Author:
Grig Bilham — inventor, architect, and author of the Universal Manifest.

Universal Manifest v0.5 - Conformance

v0.5.0. Published as tag v0.5.0 of UniversalManifest/universal-manifest, with the same wire files as release candidate 1 (v0.5.0-rc.1). Wire version 0.5; namespace https://universalmanifest.net/ns/v0.5; reading routes /spec/v0.5/. It is a mechanism release, not a completed implementation or conformance qualification. Feature-specific PREVIEW and conditional requirements remain in force.

v0.5.0 inherits the accepted v0.4 editorial contract, adds a distinct wire/namespace identity and selects the stricter Profile A predicate. It is published and remains unqualified as a complete implementation. Migration and release notes distinguish old public bytes, inherited features and candidate changes.

Conformance in v0.5 is defined against the abstract data model, not against any single serialization. An implementation conforms by correctly handling the abstract properties and semantics of a manifest after consuming it through at least one production rule (Base Section 4.5).

Primary references:

1) Conformance targets

v0.5 defines conformance for:

A conformance claim names the tiers and optional features it covers. The tier stack is additive: a Tier-1 claim implies Tier-0; Base + EXT-T1 is the Tier-1 surface; Base + EXT-T1 + EXT-T2 is the Tier-2 surface; and so on. Optional features (statusRef, bilateral sessions, federation, CBOR-LD, scope registry, and the rest of EXT-OPT) are claimed independently of tier.

Claims and reports MUST identify the implemented, partial, or not-implemented state of each claimed obligation, its exact source section, actual executed checks/evidence, finite limits, and the mandatory baseline for every unmet check, following EXT-OPT O11.1. A partial declaration does not waive a requirement or raise verification, assurance, or trust tier. Normative checks, structural PREVIEW checks, and unexecuted design-stage candidates remain distinct; a matching fixture verdict does not prove an unexecuted cryptographic primitive. This reporting rule creates no manifest member or wire capability carrier.

Bounded selective minimum disclosure is part of the v0.5 Base behavior. In plain language, each viewer, verifier, system, or use case receives only the minimum information it is allowed or needs to see. A v0.5 Base conformance claim covers this bounded profile through Stage 3 Project, Stage 4 Consent, sealed-entry handling, and structured receipts. It does not claim unlinkability, full or partial, cover-slot indistinguishability, resolver-operator privacy, or complete residual-fingerprint resistance. No v0.5 claim establishes them.

2) Required behaviour (evaluator)

For the bounded selective-minimum-disclosure profile, the Project and Consent stages work together: the evaluator processes only the facets, claims, pointers, and device entries relevant to the viewer/verifier/system/use case and authorized by the interaction context; withheld facets are not projected and are not evidence of absence; and the receipt records the resulting per-facet outcome honestly.

An evaluator claiming v0.5 conformance MUST:

Deliberately offline/no-resolver evaluation records keyRefResolution: "not-attempted"; failed/unavailable attempted resolution records "unresolved"; authorized matching resolution records "resolved". Unattempted/unresolved keyRef-derived identity remains Tier0, and embedded-key mathematics is not identity authority. Present but unexecuted presentation proof verification records "not-evaluated"; actual absence records "absent". Required interactive proofs refuse on absence, failure or non-evaluation. These are honest diagnostics, not adoption of a signed-receipt mandate or additional evidence carrier.

  1. Execute all six stages of the evaluation sequence in order (Arrive, Verify, Project, Consent, Compose, Receipt). See spec text Section 3.1.
  2. Consume the manifest through at least one conformant production rule and operate on the resulting abstract data model. JSON-LD is the reference encoding; an evaluator MAY additionally support CBOR-LD or another conformant encoding. See spec text Section 1.7 and Section 4.5.
  3. Verify the signature over the canonical signing bytes defined by the production rule, retaining required envelope fields, TTL rejection and the keyRef ↔︎ publicKeySpkiB64 consistency check. For wire 0.5 Profile A, MUST enforce all six requirements of Base §1.6.1.1; earlier-version compatibility paths retain their own profile rules.
  4. Pin the content-hashed v0.5 context document (SHA-256 27ab5a3cc491cee7a5947b73f550c07ecbff285a81a6ba801aa98f60046dcea4) and verify its hash before trusting term definitions; an evaluator MUST NOT dereference an arbitrary remote context at evaluation time. The expected hash is the sha2-256 multihash zQmR1W9vsPrdbXmhH38jdNhdEhBB1C7JUL1Z9kZMi6u16i7, computed over the exact bytes of the versioned context document (verbatim body and computation rule: Base Appendix B, EXT-OPT Section O1.7). See spec text Section 6.10.
  5. Produce a structured receipt for every processed manifest. The receipt MUST include @type (with um:Receipt), manifestId, outcome, signatureCheck, freshnessCheck, and facetStatuses (empty array when the manifest contains zero facets). See spec text Section 3.3.
  6. Record each per-facet status using the v0.5 status set: processed, opaque, consent-denied, consent-missing, trustTierUnsupported, assuranceInsufficient, not-projected, or written (assuranceInsufficient and written arise from the assurance-floor and write-authorization PREVIEW features). See spec text Section 3.3.1.
  7. Treat encrypted facets as sealed entries when the evaluator lacks a decryption key, and MUST NOT reject a manifest solely because it contains undecryptable encrypted facets. See spec text Section 2.3 and Section 3.1.4.
  8. Match consents[].facetRef against each projected facet's @id. When no matching consent entry exists, record consent-missing and MUST NOT process the facet's data. Treat expired or withdrawn consents as absent. See spec text Section 1.4.4 and Section 3.1.4.
  9. For any claim relied upon at Tier 1 or above, require a verified holder binding; a claim lacking a verifiable holder binding MUST be capped at Tier 0 (holderBindingStatus: "failed" for a failed binding, "absent" for a missing one). See spec text Section 6.6 and EXT-T1.
  10. When an interactive presentation is required, require a presentationProof whose challenge and audience match the verifier-issued challenge; reject or cap claims that fail this proof-of-possession. Of the three proofType values, only did-auth is exercised by the fixture suite and reference implementation today; sd-jwt-kb and bbs-derived are at-risk (see Section 9) and MUST fail closed when unimplemented. See EXT-T1 Section T1.2.
  11. MUST NOT treat a stale liveness attestation as equivalent to current human presence; an attestation past its validUntil is unknown regardless of attestedAt. See EXT-T1 Section T1.3.
  12. Respect requiredTrustTier declarations at the manifest, claim, and facet levels. Tier floors raise only - claim and facet floors MUST NOT lower the manifest-level floor. See spec text Section 6.4.5.
  13. When claiming the per-facet floors PREVIEW feature, respect requiredLiveness floors: a facet carrying the floor MUST NOT be processed unless a validated livenessAttestation satisfies the requested minFreshness and, when required, userVerified: true. An evaluator that does not implement floor enforcement MUST fail closed: a floor-bearing facet is withheld, never processed (Base Section 4.7). See EXT-T1 Section T1.3.1.
  14. When claiming the per-facet floors PREVIEW feature, respect requiredAssuranceClass floors: a facet below its required class MUST be withheld, MUST NOT be downgraded, and MUST be recorded assuranceInsufficient (the assuranceStatus echo object SHOULD additionally be recorded). The same fail-closed baseline applies to evaluators that do not implement floor enforcement. See EXT-T1 Section T1.3.3.
  15. Record trustTierUnsupported in the receipt when the required tier has no implemented verification profile (e.g., a Tier-2 or Tier-3 requirement on a Tier-1 evaluator), and MUST NOT downgrade to a lower tier.
  16. Apply the Section 3.1.2 clock-skew discipline at its stated normative levels: the tolerance for issuedAt/expiresAt comparisons SHOULD be no more than 60 seconds; manifests with issuedAt more than 60 seconds in the future SHOULD be rejected with freshnessCheck: "stale"; wider tolerances MUST be documented in the conformance claim. See spec text Section 3.1.2.
  17. Preserve unknown members for processing purposes (so the signature still verifies) and act only on recognized members. Unknown members MUST NOT be stripped before signature verification and MUST NOT change a decision.
  18. When signature.statusRef is present and the evaluator claims revocation-aware verification, resolve revocation status per the statusRef resolution schema (Section 3.4) and record revocationStatus. Evaluators not implementing revocation-aware verification MUST report revocationStatus: "unchecked" and MUST NOT claim revocation-aware conformance.
  19. When claiming the private-data PREVIEW features, enforce their fail-closed limits: per-facet isolation claims are cross-field structural obligations, writes require target-facet write consent, unlock windows never lower per-facet floors or isolation, key-lifecycle receipt events are assertions rather than erasure proof, and derived writes MUST NOT down-label when a profile supplies a sensitivity ordering. See Base Sections 2.3.5, 3.1.4, 7.2 and EXT-OPT Sections O3 and O4.5.

3) Required behaviour (holder)

A holder claiming v0.5 conformance MUST:

  1. Set manifestVersion: "0.5" and include the v0.5 versioned context https://universalmanifest.net/ns/v0.5 in @context.
  2. Generate an opaque @id (e.g., urn:uuid:<uuidv4>) per Section 1.2.2, and produce the manifest through a conformant production rule.
  3. Bind subject to a stable identifier URI (typically a DID), and bound expiresAt to a sensible interaction lifetime relative to issuedAt.
  4. Sign the manifest using a recognized signature profile, with signature.keyRef present and signature.value populated over the canonical signing bytes. Signature Profile A (signature.algorithm: "Ed25519", signature.canonicalization: "JCS-RFC8785") remains the default and the mandatory-to-implement evaluator baseline. A holder MAY use Signature Profile B (signature.algorithm: "ES256", signature.canonicalization: "JCS-RFC8785") when supported by the intended evaluator, under EXT-OPT O15; its signature value is the raw 64-byte R || S encoding. When evaluator support is unknown, the holder uses Profile A or accepts fail-closed rejection; it MUST NOT assume Profile B support or fall back to an unsigned manifest.
  5. Where consents are used, include them as full v0.5 consent entries with @id, @type: "um:Consent", facetRef matching a facet's @id, scope, purpose, grantedAt, and expiresAt.
  6. Where encrypted facets are used, set encryptionProfile: "jwe-inline-v1" on the facet and supply a conformant JWE JSON Serialization object as the entity value, using an algorithm pair consistent with the JWE algorithm constraints. See spec text Section 2.3.2 and Section 2.4.
  7. Where per-facet floors are used, provide well-formed requiredLiveness and requiredAssuranceClass values and the liveness/provenance evidence needed for the evaluator to satisfy or refuse those floors. See EXT-T1 Section T1.3.
  8. For any claim intended to be relied upon at Tier 1 or above, include a holderBinding with a valid mode (sd-jwt-kb, bbs-holder-commitment, or reciprocal-control) and the fields that mode requires (e.g., cnfThumbprint for sd-jwt-kb; boundDid, subjectProof, and boundDidProof for reciprocal-control). See EXT-T1 Section T1.1.
  9. When presenting interactively, include a presentationProof containing proofType, challenge, audience, created, and proofValue. See EXT-T1 Section T1.2.
  10. Where Tier-2 binding is asserted, include a bindingProof of a defined type (ZkLinkedSecretProof or ZkHdDerivationProof) with the fields that type requires. See EXT-T2 and spec text Section 6.4.7.
  11. Where Tier-3 ceremony is asserted, include a ceremonyProof (type: "ThresholdAttestationProof") with threshold, attesters, ceremonyId, and aggregateProof. See EXT-T3 and spec text Section 6.4.8.
  12. Where identity.crossDidBinding claims are issued, populate all required fields (@type, issuer, boundDids containing at least 2 DIDs) and, for attester-asserted bindings, the attester triple (attester, attestationMethod, attestedAt); the triple is OPTIONAL when a cryptographic bindingProof or ceremonyProof carries the binding. See spec text Section 6.4.4.
  13. Where um:agentDelegation pointers are issued, populate all required fields (@type: "um:agentDelegation", delegateType, delegatedBy matching the manifest subject, delegatedAt, expiresAt), using registered scope values where the scope registry applies. See spec text Section 6.5 and EXT-OPT.
  14. Where write authorization, unlock-window, key-lifecycle receipt, or sensitivity-ordering PREVIEW features are claimed, use the wire members and scope/event/profile tokens defined by Base Sections 3.1.4 and 7.2 plus EXT-OPT Sections O3 and O4.5.

4) Required behaviour (bilateral participant)

A Conformant Bilateral Participant MUST implement both Evaluator Behaviour (Section 2) and Holder Behaviour (Section 3). In a bilateral exchange:

See spec text Section 4.3 and Section 6.4.6; EXT-OPT Section O4.

5) Conformance fixtures

Dated finite TypeScript qualification (2026-10-21). The candidate index, SHA-256 6334fe4f61198d087ddb8260ba467ba42507dfb852d2643d5de84619dc804e3b, contains 188 cases, all matched by the actual command adapter. The strict Draft 2020-12 schema/ingress sweep passed 192 checks (188 indexed inputs, three examples, one targeted malformed-JWE control); the current API qualification passed 38 named groups, including the packaged-context byte/hash check, corrupted-module rejection, trusted-context and scoped-refusal controls, resolver-not-called behavior, dense-list enforcement, opaque-data preservation and historical-version controls. This evidence pins TypeScript source SHA-256 7f38f3480bda854ab66e75723fbeb2509768211f0aef85df9cad46ba1b54b29e, built implementation SHA-256 e561f61d6308a87879880aaf08c81208abe2835007e9dcb9fd12f365d0e4094b, bundled context-module source SHA-256 4ca50655a6bf28eb7f26cb16072a2cece498629fcdefde3533315bb4f988e7f8, and built context module SHA-256 44f0748b9e64491f054d3f46816fc344ed7ac2b46fa4d933388564abef7774a1. These implementation hashes identify the bounded reference; they are not additional wire/context pins. All 164 earlier fixture bodies and every original verdict, receipt expectation and caller context remain unchanged, as does all supplemental JWE index data. The earlier 114-to-164 expansion added fifty signed consent/time/operation/gate-order/trust-floor controls and clarified two caller read contexts; this context repair does not change those again. The 24 additional cases have independently valid outer signatures: 11 accepted controls and 13 context refusals. Twelve refusals are structurally valid; the empty-root-array refusal is structurally invalid. Schema validity alone does not establish trusted context interpretation. The separately dated 46/46 I-JSON checks (2026-10-16) remain distinct from the changed evaluator's current runs. The report deliberately returns conformanceLevel: "none"; positive Tier-1+ verification, authenticated services, other holder implementations and protected/private mechanisms remain unproved. Reader and public-package propagation require separate acceptance of these changed inputs.

Fixed offline reference context (implementation limit). Before interpreting UM terms, the reference implementation verifies the actual packaged normative UTF-8 context bytes against the existing content hash. Its trusted reference forms are the exact https://universalmanifest.net/ns/v0.5 scalar or a nonempty dense list containing only that reference; repeated trusted references are supported. In interpreted UM scopes, including the root, facets, claims and consents, substitutions, inline remaps, resets and arbitrary remote contexts refuse before signature execution or resolver use. Refusal receipts report signatureCheck: "not-evaluated", freshnessCheck: "not-evaluated" and keyRefResolution: "not-attempted". This is fixed offline context support, not arbitrary JSON-LD expansion or remote loading, and not a new restriction on the normative wire model. Entity data, embedded credential/VP proof payloads and unknown-member payload contexts remain byte-preserved, uninterpreted signed data; they confer no UM interpretation, proof verification, identity or authority. A separate selected profile or proof processor must establish its own semantics and verification.

Receipt check assertions (2026-10-30). The candidate index now asserts signatureCheck and freshnessCheck on all 119 fixtures in evaluation mode, with values derived from each fixture's bytes and evaluation clock. Its SHA-256 is 940e23629c246596ef91c7ed7dc8f6fef6242fa6af3b287a2ba85555bc872a19. The case count stays 188, and entries dated earlier describe the earlier index. The TypeScript and Rust adapters each match 188 of 188. Rewriting either field in a receipt now fails every fixture that asserts the rewritten value.

Known limit on malformed created (2026-10-30). A malformed signature.created fails validation under the schema, and section 1.6.2 of the Base says so. The current TypeScript and Rust evaluators do not yet agree with the schema on every malformed value, so no claim may say they conform on those values. A later package rebuild carries the correction.

Resource limits, consent entries and created (2026-10-31). The candidate index adds eight signed cases and now holds 196 cases, SHA-256 e8c72773514ddd0822c5b2b81f890ae9b557bad775309def1be70ed58b053434. Six test the Base section 6.3 limits at each boundary, and two test more than one consent entry on a facet. The TypeScript and Rust command adapters each match 196 of 196, and 79 of 79 on the v0.4 index. Entries dated earlier describe the earlier index. Both evaluators now apply the schema's date-time rule to signature.created on the v0.5 path, so the known limit above is corrected for the values tested. The Base section 6.3 limits apply to the v0.5 path, and v0.4 keeps its own rules.

I-JSON ingress (2026-11-06). A fresh check found that the TypeScript evaluator skipped the size limit when a manifest could not be canonicalized, and accepted a 1.2 MB signed manifest with a lone surrogate inside signature. The Rust evaluator rejected it. Base section 1.6.3 now requires the whole manifest as received to be I-JSON, including members outside the signing input. Both evaluators now reject such input: Rust and the TypeScript ingress parser at parse, and the TypeScript evaluator at Arrive with um:reason:structure:malformed. The candidate index adds two signed cases and now holds 198 cases, SHA-256 f3c812984f47f284a3254dc8d51b1cba8140a06ba41238f6bce3b7f8e4cdb97c. The TypeScript and Rust command adapters each match 198 of 198, and 79 of 79 on the v0.4 index. The v0.5 schema sweep passes 202 checks. Entries dated earlier describe the earlier index.

Known differences between the two reference evaluators (2026-11-06). These are outside the v0.5 suite, and both are documented deviations:

Corrected evaluation boundaries (2026-10-21). The earlier fifty controls exercise grantedAt <= now < expiresAt, a caller-supplied nonempty operation list whose every member is covered by consent, malformed caller context/clock/ceiling refusal, and sealed-entry → consent → assurance/liveness/trust-floor order. A configured trust ceiling or successful key lookup does not create implemented Tier-1+ support; the current implementation's floor decisions use its actual Tier-0 support. Mixed-facet cases and adjacent positives check the resulting receipt and per-facet decisions. Matching purpose is necessary at the purpose gate; omitted, empty and mismatching purposes produce consent-denied / purpose-mismatch, while malformed required consent purposes structurally reject before signature verification. The two persisted encrypted-Entity cases retain valid outer signatures and all four opaque facet rows in the actual command run. Refusal evidence does not establish positive verification, decryption or full conformance.

Detached cryptographic evidence (2026-10-16). The TypeScript and Rust production Profile A predicates agreed with the retained expectations on all 937 identical inputs (3 accept, 934 reject). This qualifies that finite signature-predicate boundary only. It does not establish full evaluator or SDK parity. Four accepted two-recipient ciphertexts containing two real JSON um:Entity plaintexts remain unchanged in the two corpus manifests signed for that qualification. Separate Rust/panva-jose calls read those persisted signed files and passed 16 exact-plaintext opens: 8 cross-implementation and 8 self-controls. TypeScript's four opaque facet results establish sealed-entry handling, not decryption. Earlier Entity evidence of 112 ordered wrong-key refusals reaching unwrap (56 per consumer) and 24 tamper refusals is reused because the ciphertexts, decryptors and dependencies are exactly unchanged; those matrices were not rerun. The older primitive experiment's 8 cross-opens, 36 wrong-key refusals and 156 malformed/tampered refusals remain a separate experiment. Neither supplemental decryption calls nor reused negative controls add entries to the current 188-case ordinary suite; primitive free-text payloads are not conformant Entity fixtures.

The Rust JWE software subset's unsupported parameters and size/key limits are described as implementation limits in Base §2.4.2. They are not universal JOSE prohibitions. Successful authorized opens must precede ordered cross-facet key attempts, and lookup failures must remain distinct from unwrap/authentication failures (Base §2.3.5). Software evidence does not establish hardware custody, recipient authority, global entropy quality, or complete privacy guarantees. All 43 evaluator/holder/bilateral/suite obligations and conditional requirements remain in force.

To claim v0.5 conformance, an implementation MUST:

  1. Process every fixture listed in conformance/v0.5/expected.json.
  2. Match each fixture's expectedResult; do not infer expected behavior from the directory name alone.
  3. For evaluation-mode fixtures, emit a structured receipt whose outcome and facet status match the expected outcome.
  4. For schema-only verification, follow each fixture's schemaValidation.expectedResult / classification where present. The v0.5 ceremony shape requires unique attester IDs; the evaluator additionally enforces positive M,N and M ≤ distinct attesters ≤ N. A cross-DID bindingProof permits exactly two boundDids; ceremony alone may bind more. Valid structure does not verify an aggregate or choose its protocol.

5.1 Valid fixtures

Location: conformance/v0.5/valid/. The migrated index retains evaluation-mode accepted-partial / accepted-with-warnings outcomes and receipt-observable statuses, including an assurance-floor reject and an explicitly routed v0.3 envelope that the v0.5 schema rejects. The earlier fifty signed controls also live here: valid signatures can accompany denied consent, unsupported floors or malformed caller inputs. The new context cases add 11 accepted controls here and 13 refusals under invalid/; all 24 have independently valid outer signatures. Context refusals precede signature execution and resolver use, so compare the indexed not-evaluated / not-attempted receipt states rather than inferring verification from valid test signatures. Preserve each indexed evaluationContext, including intentionally omitted, empty or malformed values; never infer requested operations or purpose from a grant. Compare all indexed assertions, including exact ordered expectedBehavior.receipt.facetStatuses arrays for mixed facets, rather than only the first row. The portable fixture guide describes the full assertion contract. Directory placement alone is not an oracle; use each indexed expected outcome:

  • minimal-signed-manifest.jsonld - baseline v0.5 signed envelope (no facets, no claims) verifying under Signature Profile A.
  • minimal-es256-signed-manifest.jsonld - the same baseline envelope verifying under Signature Profile B (JCS + ES256; EXT-OPT Section O15). The Section 1.6.3 signing input is byte-identical to Profile A - only the signature primitive differs - and signature.value is the base64url of the 64-byte raw R || S (EXT-OPT Section O15.1).
  • es256-high-s-signature.jsonld - a genuine Profile B signature whose S component is deliberately above n/2 ("high-S"), which MUST be accepted. Profile B imposes no low-S rule and no RFC 6979 requirement (EXT-OPT Section O15.2): Secure Enclave / StrongBox / TPM signers expose no nonce control and do not guarantee low-S, so a canonical-S rule would make every hardware-resident key non-conformant. An evaluator that rejects this fixture has added a malleability check the profile forbids.
  • es256-signed-manifest-with-facets.jsonld - Profile B over a body carrying facets and consents, showing the signing input is suite-independent.
  • manifest-with-holder-binding.jsonld - claim carrying a holderBinding in sd-jwt-kb mode per EXT-T1 Section T1.1.
  • manifest-with-bilateral-session-receipt.jsonld - manifest with facets and consents suitable for bilateral session evaluation.
  • manifest-with-zkp-binding-proof.jsonld - claim carrying a ZkLinkedSecretProof bindingProof per Section 6.4.7.
  • manifest-with-ceremony-proof.jsonld - claim carrying a ThresholdAttestationProof ceremonyProof per Section 6.4.8 (transitional: predates the protocol member, which is REQUIRED only at wire freeze - EXT-T3 Section T3.1).
  • manifest-with-agent-delegation-scopes.jsonld - um:agentDelegation pointer with core scope values per Section 6.5.
  • manifest-with-encrypted-facet.jsonld - facet using the JWE inline profile (carried forward from v0.3).
  • manifest-with-isolated-facets.jsonld - two encrypted facets with distinct recipient kid values and distinct IVs for the per-facet isolation smoke path.
  • facet-required-liveness.jsonld - facet carrying a well-formed requiredLiveness floor.
  • consent-with-write-scope.jsonld - consent whose scope includes a write operation for a target facet.
  • receipt-facet-key-shredded.jsonld - receipt manifest carrying facet-key-rotated / facet-key-shredded lifecycle events.
  • consent-unlock-window.jsonld - consent carrying unlock.window scope and an enumerated unlock-window facet set.
  • facet-required-assurance-class.jsonld - locked facet carrying requiredAssuranceClass: "hardware-bound" plus a locked liveness floor.
  • facet-assurance-hardware-uv.jsonld - facet carrying the intermediate requiredAssuranceClass: "hardware-uv" rung.
  • facet-assurance-software.jsonld - facet carrying the default/lowest requiredAssuranceClass: "software" rung.
  • manifest-locked-facet-below-floor.jsonld - structurally valid manifest that MUST reject in evaluation mode with assuranceInsufficient when presented with a software-class unlock below a hardware-bound floor.
  • manifest-with-unknown-members.jsonld - unknown root members, an unknown entity field, and a devices array, all covered by a genuine signature; an implementation that strips unknown members before verification fails this fixture.
  • manifest-with-bbs-holder-binding.jsonld - bbs-holder-commitment holder binding carrying its required commitment and proofValue plus an optional pseudonymScope per EXT-T1 Section T1.1.1.
  • manifest-with-reciprocal-holder-binding.jsonld - reciprocal-control holder binding carrying its required boundDid, subjectProof, and boundDidProof per EXT-T1 Section T1.1.
  • manifest-with-presentation-proof.jsonld - interactive presentation with a genuine did-auth presentationProof per EXT-T1 Section T1.2; the manifest signature excludes presentationProof from the signing input, and keyRefResolution: "unresolved" caps keyRef-derived identity at Tier 0.
  • manifest-with-liveness-attestation.jsonld - well-formed livenessAttestation evaluated inside its validity window; livenessStatus.freshnessClass records live per EXT-T1 Section T1.3.
  • liveness-attestation-past-valid-until.jsonld - stale-liveness replay check: an attestation past its validUntil classifies unknown regardless of attestedAt and is never treated as current human presence.
  • agent-delegation-fail-closed-defaults.jsonld - delegation with an empty scope (grants no capabilities) and no delegateId (attributed to no agent); both fail-closed defaults are receipt-observable warnings (accepted-with-warnings).
  • facet-without-consent.jsonld - facet with no governing consent entry records consent-missing and is not processed (accepted-partial).
  • consent-expired.jsonld - expired consent treated as absent: facet consent-denied with consent status expired.
  • consent-withdrawn.jsonld - withdrawn consent (withdrawnAt set) treated as absent: facet consent-denied with consent status withdrawn.
  • consent-scope-mismatch-read.jsonld - intended read operation not literally present in the consent scope: facet consent-denied with consent status scope-mismatch.
  • consent-unknown-condition.jsonld - consent condition the evaluator cannot recognize or enforce fails closed: facet consent-denied with consent status condition-violated.
  • encrypted-facet-sealed-entry.jsonld - encrypted facet the evaluator cannot decrypt is acknowledged as a sealed entry (opaque, outcome accepted-partial), never rejected solely for being undecryptable.
  • claim-unrecognized-type.jsonld - unrecognized claim @type treated as unprocessable (present but unverifiable above Tier 0) and recorded in claimStatuses.
  • pointer-unrecognized-type.jsonld - unrecognized pointer @type recorded as present (receipt unprocessedEntries) and not acted on.
  • claim-tier-cap-no-holder-binding.jsonld - claim relied upon at Tier 1 with no holderBinding is capped at Tier 0: holderBindingStatus: "absent", effectiveTrustTier 0, claim recorded trustTierUnsupported.
  • claim-tier-unsupported-by-evaluator.jsonld - Tier-2 claim on a Tier-1 evaluator treated as unverifiable and recorded trustTierUnsupported without downgrading (accepted-partial).
  • cross-did-binding-proof-only.jsonld - identity.crossDidBinding carrying a cryptographic bindingProof and no attester triple; the attester fields are required only for attester-asserted bindings per Section 6.4.4.
  • v03-backcompat-manifest.jsonld - v0.3 envelope processed through the EXT-T1 Section T1.6.4 backwards-compatibility path (absent binding statuses, tier capped at 0, unbound-claims warning); the v0.5 structural schema rejects it while the evaluator accepts it.

5.2 Invalid fixtures

Located under conformance/v0.5/invalid/:

  • holder-binding-invalid-mode.jsonld - holderBinding.mode outside the enum (sd-jwt-kb | bbs-holder-commitment | reciprocal-control).
  • holder-binding-missing-cnf.jsonld - sd-jwt-kb mode without the required cnfThumbprint.
  • ceremony-proof-insufficient-attesters.jsonld - ceremonyProof.attesters smaller than the M required by threshold.
  • binding-proof-invalid-type.jsonld - bindingProof.type not ZkLinkedSecretProof or ZkHdDerivationProof.
  • missing-signature.jsonld - no signature member.
  • claim-tier-below-manifest-floor.jsonld - claim.requiredTrustTier lower than manifest.requiredTrustTier (Section 6.4.5; the floor raises only).
  • required-liveness-bad-minfreshness.jsonld - requiredLiveness.minFreshness uses a value outside live / recent / stale.
  • required-liveness-not-object.jsonld - requiredLiveness is not an object.
  • facet-assurance-class-bad-enum-shape.jsonld - requiredAssuranceClass uses a value outside software / hardware-uv / hardware-bound.
  • facet-assurance-class-not-string-shape.jsonld - requiredAssuranceClass is not a string enum value.
  • bad-signature-value.jsonld - cryptographically wrong signature.value (bit-flipped after signing); Ed25519 verification over the Section 1.6.3 signing input fails, while a signature-presence-only implementation would accept.
  • tampered-after-signing.jsonld - subject mutated after signing, so the signature no longer covers the canonical bytes.
  • key-substitution-mismatch.jsonld - embedded publicKeySpkiB64 substituted with a foreign key after signing (the Section 1.6.4 key-substitution attack).
  • expired-manifest.jsonld - evaluation clock past expiresAt; the signature is genuine and only TTL math rejects (freshnessCheck: "expired").
  • issued-after-expires.jsonld - issuedAt later than expiresAt (cross-field temporal misuse over a genuine signature).
  • future-issued-at.jsonld - issuedAt more than 60 seconds in the future; rejected with freshnessCheck: "stale" per Section 3.1.2.
  • manifest-version-mismatch.jsonld - manifestVersion: "0.6" is supported by no v0.5 processing path (v0.3 envelopes instead take the EXT-T1 Section T1.6.4 backwards-compatibility path).
  • unsupported-signature-profile.jsonld - signature.algorithm: "ES384" is not a recognized suite, so the (algorithm, canonicalization) pair names no registered profile; rejected with signatureCheck: "unsupported-profile" (Section 1.5.1/1.6.5). ES384 is a well-formed IANA/JOSE algorithm token that Universal Manifest does not register, so the fixture exercises the unknown-profile path and nothing else: the manifest carries a genuine Ed25519 Profile A signature over a matching Ed25519 SPKI, and only the suite token is unrecognized. Rejection MUST occur at the profile-pair check, before any key or value inspection, and the pair MUST NOT be reinterpreted as a recognized suite. The test is re-keyed off "ES256", which became a recognized suite (Signature Profile B) in v0.5; it remains unconditional because the schema algorithm enum structurally rejects any token outside the registered set.
  • es256-bad-signature-value.jsonld - cryptographically wrong Profile B signature.value (bit-flipped after signing); ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 verification over the Section 1.6.3 signing input fails.
  • es256-tampered-after-signing.jsonld - subject mutated after Profile B signing, so the signature no longer covers the canonical bytes.
  • es256-key-substitution-mismatch.jsonld - embedded publicKeySpkiB64 substituted with a foreign P-256 key after signing (the Section 1.6.4 key-substitution attack); the suite and key type are both correct, only the key is wrong.
  • es256-der-encoded-signature-value.jsonld - a cryptographically genuine Profile B signature encoded as 72-byte DER/X9.62 instead of the mandated 64-byte raw R || S (EXT-OPT Section O15.1); DER MUST be rejected. Because the profile pair is recognized, the reason code is signatureCheck: "invalid" (a malformed value under a recognized profile), not "unsupported-profile".
  • es256-spki-algorithm-mismatch.jsonld - an Ed25519 SPKI declared under algorithm: "ES256"; the REQUIRED SPKI-algorithm-vs-algorithm consistency check (EXT-OPT Section O15.4) fails, in either direction. Reason code signatureCheck: "invalid", not "unsupported-profile".
  • type-missing-um-manifest.jsonld - @type does not include um:Manifest.
  • context-wrong-namespace.jsonld - @context carries a substituted namespace that cannot match the pinned v0.5 context document (Section 6.10 context substitution).
  • holder-binding-reciprocal-missing-fields.jsonld - reciprocal-control mode without subjectProof / boundDidProof; rejected as a binding failure.
  • holder-binding-bbs-missing-commitment.jsonld - bbs-holder-commitment mode without its required commitment field (EXT-T1 Section T1.1.1).
  • presentation-proof-challenge-mismatch.jsonld - presentationProof.challenge does not match the verifier-issued nonce; replay-suspect, rejected for interactive verification.
  • presentation-proof-audience-mismatch.jsonld - presentationProof.audience does not match this verifier; rejected for interactive verification.
  • presentation-proof-missing-when-challenged.jsonld - the verifier issued a challenge and the manifest carries no presentationProof; presentationProofStatus: "absent", rejected for interactive verification.
  • liveness-missing-valid-until.jsonld - livenessAttestation without its required validUntil (EXT-T1 Section T1.3).
  • agent-delegation-delegatedby-mismatch.jsonld - um:agentDelegation whose delegatedBy does not match the manifest subject (Section 6.5.1).
  • agent-delegation-expired.jsonld - um:agentDelegation past its expiresAt; expired delegations are rejected (Section 6.5.1).
  • encrypted-facet-malformed-jwe.jsonld - encrypted facet whose JWE lacks iv and tag; structural conformance requires all five JWE JSON Serialization fields (Section 2.3.2).
  • facet-tier-below-manifest-floor.jsonld - facet.requiredTrustTier lower than manifest.requiredTrustTier (Section 6.4.5; the floor raises only).
  • v03-backcompat-tier-floor-unsatisfiable.jsonld - v0.3 envelope declaring a Tier-1 floor that cannot be satisfied at the backwards-compatibility Tier-0 cap; rejected per Section 6.4.5 and EXT-T1 Section T1.6.4.
  • claim-proof-oversize-vp.jsonld - embedded claimProof VP over the 50 KB per-VP limit (Section 6.4.3).
  • missing-subject.jsonld - missing required subject (Section 1.3.2).
  • missing-expires-at.jsonld - missing required expiresAt (Section 1.3.3).
  • consent-missing-facet-ref.jsonld - consent entry missing its required facetRef (Section 1.4.4).
  • signature-keyref-without-embedded-key.jsonld - keyRef resolution unavailable by construction and no publicKeySpkiB64 embedded; the manifest cannot be verified (Section 1.6.4 key-resolution ladder).

The TypeScript command adapter executes the new signed corpus under conformance/v0.5/expected.json. Valid Tier-2/3-shaped objects are only structure controls: they do not establish aggregate verification, attester authorization, holder identity or higher-tier authority.

5.3 Schema-detectable vs evaluator-only rejections

The direct JSON Schema contract is intentionally structural. conformance/v0.5/expected.json is the normative fixture matrix for schema sweep behavior:

  • Schema-detectable rejects: invalid/holder-binding-invalid-mode.jsonld, invalid/holder-binding-missing-cnf.jsonld, invalid/binding-proof-invalid-type.jsonld, invalid/missing-signature.jsonld, invalid/required-liveness-bad-minfreshness.jsonld, invalid/required-liveness-not-object.jsonld, invalid/facet-assurance-class-bad-enum-shape.jsonld, invalid/facet-assurance-class-not-string-shape.jsonld, invalid/manifest-version-mismatch.jsonld, invalid/unsupported-signature-profile.jsonld, invalid/type-missing-um-manifest.jsonld, invalid/context-wrong-namespace.jsonld, invalid/holder-binding-reciprocal-missing-fields.jsonld, invalid/holder-binding-bbs-missing-commitment.jsonld, invalid/liveness-missing-valid-until.jsonld, invalid/encrypted-facet-malformed-jwe.jsonld, invalid/v03-backcompat-tier-floor-unsatisfiable.jsonld, invalid/missing-subject.jsonld, invalid/missing-expires-at.jsonld, and invalid/consent-missing-facet-ref.jsonld.
  • Evaluator-only rejects (the schema accepts these; only the evaluator catches them — crypto verification, temporal math, challenge matching, tier logic, and resource limits are not schema-expressible): invalid/ceremony-proof-insufficient-attesters.jsonld, invalid/claim-tier-below-manifest-floor.jsonld, valid/manifest-locked-facet-below-floor.jsonld, invalid/bad-signature-value.jsonld, invalid/tampered-after-signing.jsonld, invalid/key-substitution-mismatch.jsonld, invalid/expired-manifest.jsonld, invalid/issued-after-expires.jsonld, invalid/future-issued-at.jsonld, invalid/presentation-proof-challenge-mismatch.jsonld, invalid/presentation-proof-audience-mismatch.jsonld, invalid/presentation-proof-missing-when-challenged.jsonld, invalid/agent-delegation-delegatedby-mismatch.jsonld, invalid/agent-delegation-expired.jsonld, invalid/facet-tier-below-manifest-floor.jsonld, invalid/claim-proof-oversize-vp.jsonld, invalid/signature-keyref-without-embedded-key.jsonld, invalid/resource-limit-depth-11.jsonld, invalid/resource-limit-array-1001.jsonld, and invalid/resource-limit-size-1000001.jsonld.
  • I-JSON ingress rejects (refused before schema validation, because the input is not I-JSON): invalid/duplicate-member.jsonld, invalid/escaped-duplicate-member.jsonld, invalid/malformed-json.jsonld, invalid/ijson-lone-surrogate-in-signature.jsonld, and invalid/ijson-number-overflow-in-signature.jsonld.
  • One inversion runs the other way: valid/v03-backcompat-manifest.jsonld fails the v0.5 structural schema (it is a v0.3 envelope) but is accepted by the evaluator through the EXT-T1 Section T1.6.4 backwards-compatibility path; its expected.json entry records both expectations.

Schema-only implementers MUST NOT claim full evaluator conformance from a schema sweep alone. The dated TypeScript evidence separately exercised structural/I-JSON ingress and focused API behavior. Those development commands and adapter dependencies are not part of the public specification package; external implementations consume the exact versioned fixture index and portable contract. A green finite fixture report is not full normative qualification and yields level none for the candidate report described here.

5.4 New v0.5 boundary controls

These finite controls distinguish point/scalar acceptance, P15 structure/threshold limits, honest proof states and raw I-JSON ingress. They add no aggregate-verification or identity-authority claim. Their independent per-case outcomes and schema classifications are in the index.

  • invalid/ed25519-identity-a-r.jsonld
  • invalid/ed25519-noncanonical-a.jsonld
  • invalid/ed25519-noncanonical-r.jsonld
  • invalid/ed25519-signbit-zero-x-a.jsonld
  • invalid/ed25519-signbit-zero-x-r.jsonld
  • invalid/ed25519-s-plus-order.jsonld
  • invalid/ed25519-s-order.jsonld
  • invalid/ed25519-mixed-order-a.jsonld
  • invalid/ed25519-mixed-order-r.jsonld
  • valid/ed25519-ordinary-v05.jsonld
  • invalid/ceremony-zero-m.jsonld
  • invalid/ceremony-zero-n.jsonld
  • invalid/ceremony-m-above-n.jsonld
  • invalid/ceremony-more-attesters-than-n.jsonld
  • invalid/ceremony-duplicate-attesters.jsonld
  • valid/ceremony-three-dids-shape-only.jsonld
  • invalid/ceremony-shape-not-aggregate-verification.jsonld
  • invalid/binding-proof-three-dids.jsonld
  • valid/present-proof-not-evaluated.jsonld
  • valid/absent-proof-offline.jsonld
  • invalid/present-proof-unimplemented-interactive.jsonld
  • invalid/did-auth-invalid-point-signature.jsonld
  • invalid/duplicate-member.jsonld
  • invalid/escaped-duplicate-member.jsonld
  • invalid/malformed-json.jsonld
  • valid/escaped-member-without-duplicate.jsonld

5.5 Further indexed controls

These signed controls are in the candidate index, and the index holds each one's exact expectations. The text below is the index's own reason for each.

  • valid/purpose-request-matched.jsonld - Explicit caller purpose matches the signed grant.
  • valid/purpose-request-mismatched-withheld.jsonld - No disclosure: caller purpose is different, omitted or empty; the envelope remains accepted-partial.
  • valid/purpose-request-omitted-withheld.jsonld - No disclosure: caller purpose is different, omitted or empty; the envelope remains accepted-partial.
  • valid/purpose-request-empty-withheld.jsonld - No disclosure: caller purpose is different, omitted or empty; the envelope remains accepted-partial.
  • invalid/consent-purpose-missing.jsonld - Malformed required consent purpose is invalid, never an unrestricted grant.
  • invalid/consent-purpose-nonstring.jsonld - Malformed required consent purpose is invalid, never an unrestricted grant.
  • invalid/consent-purpose-empty.jsonld - Malformed required consent purpose is invalid, never an unrestricted grant.
  • valid/encrypted-entity-rust-producer.jsonld - Fresh signed envelope over exact independently encrypted JSON Entities; the TypeScript evaluator records both facets opaque without decrypting.
  • valid/encrypted-entity-jose-producer.jsonld - Fresh signed envelope over exact independently encrypted JSON Entities; the TypeScript evaluator records both facets opaque without decrypting.
  • valid/consent-boundary-before-grant.jsonld - Signed consent boundary before-grant: withhold the governed facet; condition-violated.
  • valid/consent-boundary-at-grant.jsonld - Signed consent boundary at-grant: explicit active authorization.
  • valid/consent-boundary-before-expiry.jsonld - Signed consent boundary before-expiry: explicit active authorization.
  • valid/consent-boundary-at-expiry.jsonld - Signed consent boundary at-expiry: withhold the governed facet; expired.
  • valid/consent-boundary-after-expiry.jsonld - Signed consent boundary after-expiry: withhold the governed facet; expired.
  • valid/consent-boundary-scope-omitted.jsonld - Signed consent boundary scope-omitted: withhold the governed facet; scope-mismatch.
  • valid/consent-boundary-scope-empty.jsonld - Signed consent boundary scope-empty: withhold the governed facet; scope-mismatch.
  • valid/consent-boundary-scope-wrong.jsonld - Signed consent boundary scope-wrong: withhold the governed facet; scope-mismatch.
  • valid/consent-boundary-scope-matching.jsonld - Signed consent boundary scope-matching: explicit active authorization.
  • valid/consent-boundary-multiple-operations-covered.jsonld - Signed consent boundary multiple-operations-covered: explicit active authorization.
  • valid/consent-boundary-multiple-operations-partly-uncovered.jsonld - Signed consent boundary multiple-operations-partly-uncovered: withhold the governed facet; scope-mismatch.
  • valid/consent-boundary-scope-null.jsonld - Signed consent boundary scope-null: withhold the governed facet; scope-mismatch.
  • valid/consent-boundary-scope-string.jsonld - Signed consent boundary scope-string: withhold the governed facet; scope-mismatch.
  • valid/consent-boundary-scope-object.jsonld - Signed consent boundary scope-object: withhold the governed facet; scope-mismatch.
  • valid/consent-boundary-scope-nonstring-member.jsonld - Signed consent boundary scope-nonstring-member: withhold the governed facet; scope-mismatch.
  • valid/consent-boundary-scope-empty-member.jsonld - Signed consent boundary scope-empty-member: withhold the governed facet; scope-mismatch.
  • valid/consent-boundary-withdrawn-precedence.jsonld - Signed consent boundary withdrawn-precedence: withhold the governed facet; withdrawn.
  • valid/consent-boundary-expired-precedence.jsonld - Signed consent boundary expired-precedence: withhold the governed facet; expired.
  • valid/consent-boundary-not-yet-granted-precedence.jsonld - Signed consent boundary not-yet-granted-precedence: withhold the governed facet; condition-violated.
  • valid/consent-boundary-unknown-condition-precedence.jsonld - Signed consent boundary unknown-condition-precedence: withhold the governed facet; condition-violated.
  • valid/consent-boundary-purpose-matching.jsonld - Signed consent boundary purpose-matching: explicit active authorization.
  • valid/consent-boundary-purpose-mismatching.jsonld - Signed consent boundary purpose-mismatching: withhold the governed facet; purpose-mismatch.
  • valid/facet-gate-missing-consent-before-assurance.jsonld - Explicit signed facet-gate-missing-consent-before-assurance oracle: accepted-partial; configured capability never establishes achieved identity trust.
  • valid/facet-gate-withdrawn-consent-before-assurance.jsonld - Explicit signed facet-gate-withdrawn-consent-before-assurance oracle: accepted-partial; configured capability never establishes achieved identity trust.
  • valid/facet-gate-scope-mismatch-before-assurance.jsonld - Explicit signed facet-gate-scope-mismatch-before-assurance oracle: accepted-partial; configured capability never establishes achieved identity trust.
  • valid/facet-gate-valid-consent-unmet-assurance.jsonld - Explicit signed facet-gate-valid-consent-unmet-assurance oracle: rejected; configured capability never establishes achieved identity trust.
  • valid/facet-gate-valid-consent-met-assurance.jsonld - Explicit signed facet-gate-valid-consent-met-assurance oracle: accepted; configured capability never establishes achieved identity trust.
  • valid/facet-gate-sealed-before-assurance.jsonld - Explicit signed facet-gate-sealed-before-assurance oracle: accepted-partial; configured capability never establishes achieved identity trust.
  • valid/facet-gate-sealed-without-floor.jsonld - Explicit signed facet-gate-sealed-without-floor oracle: accepted-partial; configured capability never establishes achieved identity trust.
  • valid/facet-gate-missing-consent-before-liveness.jsonld - Explicit signed facet-gate-missing-consent-before-liveness oracle: accepted-partial; configured capability never establishes achieved identity trust.
  • valid/facet-gate-valid-consent-unmet-liveness.jsonld - Explicit signed facet-gate-valid-consent-unmet-liveness oracle: rejected; configured capability never establishes achieved identity trust.
  • valid/trust-floor-manifest-0.jsonld - Explicit signed trust-floor-manifest-0 oracle: accepted; configured capability never establishes achieved identity trust.
  • valid/trust-floor-manifest-1.jsonld - Explicit signed trust-floor-manifest-1 oracle: rejected; configured capability never establishes achieved identity trust.
  • valid/trust-floor-manifest-2.jsonld - Explicit signed trust-floor-manifest-2 oracle: rejected; configured capability never establishes achieved identity trust.
  • valid/trust-floor-manifest-3.jsonld - Explicit signed trust-floor-manifest-3 oracle: rejected; configured capability never establishes achieved identity trust.
  • valid/trust-floor-facet-0.jsonld - Explicit signed trust-floor-facet-0 oracle: accepted; configured capability never establishes achieved identity trust.
  • valid/trust-floor-facet-1.jsonld - Explicit signed trust-floor-facet-1 oracle: accepted-partial; configured capability never establishes achieved identity trust.
  • valid/trust-floor-facet-2.jsonld - Explicit signed trust-floor-facet-2 oracle: accepted-partial; configured capability never establishes achieved identity trust.
  • valid/trust-floor-facet-3.jsonld - Explicit signed trust-floor-facet-3 oracle: accepted-partial; configured capability never establishes achieved identity trust.
  • valid/trust-floor-mixed-1.jsonld - Explicit signed trust-floor-mixed-1 oracle: accepted-partial; configured capability never establishes achieved identity trust.
  • valid/trust-floor-claim-1.jsonld - Explicit signed trust-floor-claim-1 oracle: accepted-partial; configured capability never establishes achieved identity trust.
  • valid/trust-floor-mixed-2.jsonld - Explicit signed trust-floor-mixed-2 oracle: accepted-partial; configured capability never establishes achieved identity trust.
  • valid/trust-floor-claim-2.jsonld - Explicit signed trust-floor-claim-2 oracle: accepted-partial; configured capability never establishes achieved identity trust.
  • valid/trust-floor-mixed-3.jsonld - Explicit signed trust-floor-mixed-3 oracle: accepted-partial; configured capability never establishes achieved identity trust.
  • valid/trust-floor-claim-3.jsonld - Explicit signed trust-floor-claim-3 oracle: accepted-partial; configured capability never establishes achieved identity trust.
  • valid/trust-floor-malformed-ceiling-string.jsonld - Explicit signed trust-floor-malformed-ceiling-string oracle: rejected; configured capability never establishes achieved identity trust.
  • valid/trust-floor-malformed-ceiling-null.jsonld - Explicit signed trust-floor-malformed-ceiling-null oracle: rejected; configured capability never establishes achieved identity trust.
  • valid/trust-floor-malformed-ceiling-too-high.jsonld - Explicit signed trust-floor-malformed-ceiling-too-high oracle: rejected; configured capability never establishes achieved identity trust.
  • valid/trust-floor-malformed-ceiling-negative.jsonld - Explicit signed trust-floor-malformed-ceiling-negative oracle: rejected; configured capability never establishes achieved identity trust.
  • valid/trust-floor-malformed-ceiling-fractional.jsonld - Explicit signed trust-floor-malformed-ceiling-fractional oracle: rejected; configured capability never establishes achieved identity trust.
  • valid/context-integrity-root-pinned-scalar.jsonld - Accept only pinned interpreted scopes; literal/unknown JSON is preserved without context authority.
  • valid/context-integrity-root-pinned-array.jsonld - Accept only pinned interpreted scopes; literal/unknown JSON is preserved without context authority.
  • valid/context-integrity-root-pinned-repeated-array.jsonld - Accept only pinned interpreted scopes; literal/unknown JSON is preserved without context authority.
  • invalid/context-integrity-root-empty-array.jsonld - Reject context substitution before interpreting UM fields; the independently valid outer signature is not executed by evaluation.
  • invalid/context-integrity-root-reset-after-pinned.jsonld - Reject context substitution before interpreting UM fields; the independently valid outer signature is not executed by evaluation.
  • invalid/context-integrity-root-prefix-substitution.jsonld - Reject context substitution before interpreting UM fields; the independently valid outer signature is not executed by evaluation.
  • invalid/context-integrity-root-remote-after-pinned.jsonld - Reject context substitution before interpreting UM fields; the independently valid outer signature is not executed by evaluation.
  • valid/context-integrity-facet-pinned-scalar.jsonld - Accept only pinned interpreted scopes; literal/unknown JSON is preserved without context authority.
  • valid/context-integrity-facet-pinned-array.jsonld - Accept only pinned interpreted scopes; literal/unknown JSON is preserved without context authority.
  • invalid/context-integrity-facet-reset.jsonld - Reject context substitution before interpreting UM fields; the independently valid outer signature is not executed by evaluation.
  • invalid/context-integrity-facet-prefix-substitution.jsonld - Reject context substitution before interpreting UM fields; the independently valid outer signature is not executed by evaluation.
  • invalid/context-integrity-facet-remote.jsonld - Reject context substitution before interpreting UM fields; the independently valid outer signature is not executed by evaluation.
  • valid/context-integrity-claim-pinned-scalar.jsonld - Accept only pinned interpreted scopes; literal/unknown JSON is preserved without context authority.
  • valid/context-integrity-claim-pinned-array.jsonld - Accept only pinned interpreted scopes; literal/unknown JSON is preserved without context authority.
  • invalid/context-integrity-claim-reset.jsonld - Reject context substitution before interpreting UM fields; the independently valid outer signature is not executed by evaluation.
  • invalid/context-integrity-claim-prefix-substitution.jsonld - Reject context substitution before interpreting UM fields; the independently valid outer signature is not executed by evaluation.
  • invalid/context-integrity-claim-remote.jsonld - Reject context substitution before interpreting UM fields; the independently valid outer signature is not executed by evaluation.
  • valid/context-integrity-consent-pinned-scalar.jsonld - Accept only pinned interpreted scopes; literal/unknown JSON is preserved without context authority.
  • valid/context-integrity-consent-pinned-array.jsonld - Accept only pinned interpreted scopes; literal/unknown JSON is preserved without context authority.
  • invalid/context-integrity-consent-reset.jsonld - Reject context substitution before interpreting UM fields; the independently valid outer signature is not executed by evaluation.
  • invalid/context-integrity-consent-prefix-substitution.jsonld - Reject context substitution before interpreting UM fields; the independently valid outer signature is not executed by evaluation.
  • invalid/context-integrity-consent-remote.jsonld - Reject context substitution before interpreting UM fields; the independently valid outer signature is not executed by evaluation.
  • valid/context-integrity-literal-entity-preserved.jsonld - Accept only pinned interpreted scopes; literal/unknown JSON is preserved without context authority.
  • valid/context-integrity-unknown-member-preserved.jsonld - Accept only pinned interpreted scopes; literal/unknown JSON is preserved without context authority.
  • valid/resource-limit-depth-10.jsonld - Nesting of exactly 10 levels, counting containers with the manifest object as level 1, is within the Base Section 6.3 default.
  • invalid/resource-limit-depth-11.jsonld - Validly signed nesting of 11 levels exceeds the Base Section 6.3 default and refuses at Arrive, before the signature check.
  • valid/resource-limit-array-1000.jsonld - An array of exactly 1,000 entries is within the Base Section 6.3 default.
  • invalid/resource-limit-array-1001.jsonld - A validly signed array of 1,001 entries exceeds the Base Section 6.3 default and refuses at Arrive, before the signature check.
  • valid/resource-limit-size-1000000.jsonld - Exactly 1,000,000 octets over the JCS-canonical form is within the Base Section 6.3 default.
  • invalid/resource-limit-size-1000001.jsonld - A validly signed 1,000,001 octets over the JCS-canonical form exceeds the Base Section 6.3 default and refuses at Arrive, before the signature check.
  • valid/consent-two-entries-both-satisfied.jsonld - Two consent entries on one facet, both satisfied: the facet is processed.
  • valid/consent-two-entries-one-purpose-mismatch.jsonld - Two consent entries on one facet, one satisfied and one with a purpose mismatch: the facet is consent-denied.
  • invalid/ijson-lone-surrogate-in-signature.jsonld - A validly signed manifest with a lone surrogate inside signature, outside the signing input, is not I-JSON and refuses at ingress.
  • invalid/ijson-number-overflow-in-signature.jsonld - A validly signed manifest with a number outside the IEEE 754 double range inside signature, outside the signing input, is not I-JSON and refuses at ingress.

6) Adversarial and misuse expectations

v0.5 conformance verification MUST include rejection tests for the v0.2/v0.3 baseline cases (signature spoofing, signature misuse, temporal misuse, manifest-version mismatch) plus v0.5-specific cases:

  1. Holder-binding bypass - a claim relied upon at Tier 1+ with no holder binding, or with an invalid mode, MUST NOT be treated as Tier 1; it caps at Tier 0. See EXT-T1.
  2. Missing binding fields - sd-jwt-kb without cnfThumbprint, or reciprocal-control without boundDid / subjectProof / boundDidProof, MUST be rejected as a binding failure.
  3. Trust-tier downgrade attempts - claim or facet floors that attempt to specify a lower requiredTrustTier than the manifest-level floor MUST be rejected (the floor raises only, Section 6.4.5).
  4. Malformed binding/ceremony proofs - a bindingProof with a type outside the defined set, or a ceremonyProof whose attesters count is below the threshold, MUST be rejected.
  5. Stale liveness replay - a livenessAttestation past its validUntil, or an interactive presentation whose presentationProof challenge/audience does not match the verifier's, MUST NOT be accepted as current human presence.
  6. Malformed JWE encrypted facets - incomplete JWE structures that an evaluator would otherwise sealed-entry through. Structural conformance MUST require all five JWE fields (protected, recipients, iv, ciphertext, tag).
  7. Context substitution - a manifest whose context document fails its content-hash check MUST NOT have its term definitions trusted (Section 6.10).
  8. Agent delegation with delegator/subject mismatch - um:agentDelegation with delegatedBy not matching the manifest subject, and expired delegation (expiresAt in the past), MUST be rejected. See Section 6.5.

7) Standalone conformance suite (external adopter path)

For implementation-neutral, external conformance execution, use the standalone suite documentation:

The standalone suite is language-neutral and encoding-neutral: it packages fixtures plus expected outcomes so implementations can prove equivalent v0.5 verification behaviour across runtimes and across conformant production rules.

For a purpose-bearing evaluation case, the harness MUST pass the case's explicit caller purpose from evaluationContext.intendedPurpose when supplied. It MUST preserve omitted or empty caller-purpose controls as such and MUST NOT derive the caller's purpose from consents[].purpose or other grant data. Fixture context is test input outside the signed manifest; these instructions introduce no request carrier or manifest member.

Only entries in the index's fixtures array define the ordinary finite suite. Supplemental jweInteroperabilityVectors, when present at the index root, is separate test evidence: honor its public-test-only key warning, consume and report its specified decryption controls separately, and never use disposable private test keys for real data or put them into manifest wire fields. TypeScript sealed-entry assertions do not prove that decryption ran; supplemental results do not establish full conformance.

8) Reference implementation evidence (non-normative)

The separately maintained TypeScript and Rust reference evaluators are two possible implementations. This public specification package excludes their development runners. The dated evidence below has the limits described in Section 5; it does not establish full conformance.

Offline signing-key resolution (2026-10-26). Both v0.5 evaluators offer optional offline did:key resolution for Ed25519 and P-256. The offlineKeyResolution context option requires a boolean; absent or false preserves existing behavior. Rust's typed context names it offline_key_resolution. TypeScript rejects true combined with a resolveKeyRef callback; that application hook remains available when offline mode is absent or false. Legacy v0.4 and standalone assertion helpers retain their defaults.

The bounded resolver accepts canonical base58btc (z) or unpadded base64url (u), canonical multicodec varints and valid key points. It selects the bare DID or its exact #<same-multibase> signing method. Queries, paths, foreign fragments, unsupported curves and malformed encodings do not resolve.

A resolved key can verify without an embedded key. When both are present, their decoded SPKI bytes must match exactly. The evaluator refuses substitution.

Failed or unavailable resolution may fall back to an embedded key and reports unresolved; without an embedded key, verification refuses. If no lookup occurs, the receipt reports not-attempted. Resolution makes no network request. Declared-suite and signature checks still apply, and root did-auth remains Ed25519-only.

SD-JWT holder binding (2026-10-26). The reference helpers perform separate, bounded issuer-signature and holder-binding mathematics using caller-authenticated issuer and holder role keys. They check the binding's signature, audience, challenge, time and presentation hash.

These checks do not establish complete subject or issuer authorization, consent, revocation status or claim identity. Root sd-jwt-kb remains a refused PREVIEW presentation-proof mode. Neither key resolution nor holder binding elevates claim or effective identity trust above Tier 0. The implementations provide no aggregate or Tier-2/3 verifier. All 43 obligations remain applicable; full conformance remains unevaluated.

Dated qualification (2026-10-26). The original TypeScript holder-binding acceptance covered 18 controls. Rust acceptance covered 43 controls, including 23 inputs shared with TypeScript. Subsequent resolver acceptance covered 108 fresh signed inputs in each runtime, including four SD-JWT composition cases.

Rust 1.85.0 separately built the unchanged locked um-core library on macOS arm64. The two focused resolver and holder-binding targets passed 12 tests. Two shared-input tests remained ignored. That compiler result covers only this library build and those targets. It does not qualify other platforms, packages or consumers. The historical corpus, ABI and bilateral results below remain bound to their original dates and artifact hashes; they are not fresh executions against later binaries.

Rust evaluator phase one (2026-10-21). Explicit APIs include assert_structural_v05, verify_manifest_v05, assert_manifest_v05_fresh, evaluate_manifest_v05, crypto::verify_manifest_signature_v05 and EvaluationContext::from_json_v05. The existing versioned generator supplies additive model_v05, schema_v05 and pins::v05 from the frozen schema/context; unqualified v0.4 models, pins and defaults remain. Shared parsing, JCS, profile selection and evaluator stages require a finite caller-pinned clock, check the actual pinned offline context before cryptography, use strict Profile A verification, retain Profile B raw-64/high-S behavior, enforce explicit purpose and fully covered operation scope, and order sealed entry → consent → floors. Achieved trust remains capped at Tier 0; unsupported proof/authority paths fail closed or retain honest unevaluated states. Sealed facets are not decrypted by the evaluator.

The phase-one command adapter matched 188/188 unchanged indexed cases, including 119 cases with strict receipt assertions; its server passed 25 HTTP controls, with 12 independent command controls. The phase-one suites passed 420 core, 22 adapter and 7 generator tests. Those results identify the phase-one adapter/server below; they are not a complete-corpus rerun against later binaries.

Local bilateral execution (2026-10-21). Selected version 0.5 reaches both counterparty evaluations and the existing durable session contract. The explicit receipt/challenge helpers use the same v0.5 strict wire predicate for action, challenge and receipt boundaries. Two persistent Swift callers commit all five operations in each positive encounter, verify actual evaluator and receipt digests and reciprocal acknowledgments, and refuse version changes after restart. Channels are locally injected evidence, not authenticated peer identity or physical radio observations. Independently installed role keys authenticate the tested signed bodies only within that local test contract.

The preserved bilateral predecessor passed the 52-control online caller suite for each of v0.4 and v0.5, including eight completed encounters per version. The observation union covers 78 v0.5 cases per command/HTTP transport and 76 v0.4 cases per transport; retained failed runs received only named version-specific expectation corrections and focused failed-subcase reruns, without changing evaluator semantics or weakening expected behavior. 422 core and 22 adapter tests passed before the final narrow implicit-v0.4 fallback correction. After that correction, one focused adapter test, two old/new byte-equal legacy comparisons and four byte-equal witness comparisons passed. The final successor then passed all eight positive v0.5 encounters, one v0.4 encounter and eight actual HTTP responses. Fresh independent command/HTTP controls cover changed-version restart, opposite-version manifests and strict action/challenge/receipt boundaries. These focused successor results do not transfer the predecessor's complete fault matrix to another binary.

Independent causal inspection of four retained caller runs plus a fresh final-binary run traced 270 action/delivery/persistence links and 54 verified signed receipts across 27 completed encounters. Both evaluator digests match the receipt bodies, whose signatures verify with independently installed role keys. The fresh run adds two mixed-suite positives and a signed-body tamper refusal. The totals describe distinct scoped observations, not a single new matrix or a certification grade.

Executed binary scope SHA-256
Phase-one adapter: complete 188-case corpus 3abdbac5be2851f8c1b84ca0c7afb7e7226938cfbe8f55c7bea8b77a744cbd18
Phase-one server: 25 HTTP controls 8e79763fad2fedae3203d0957417cb87e388dfadcd60c716f5ae5b8add5e5e0e
Bilateral predecessor adapter: full online suite f5d29ef0a93719c9934c699d595d7b1ae12dffadbdeefab46b63fd17c1930a3f
Bilateral predecessor server 0052b4c54ae0d24ca19a39c2624f55334b45856523ac100edd26b48bb61a8a84
Final successor adapter: focused compatibility/caller controls 00545a2347c7f8ffb3f6a9c7499813005c97ac4798d11dcd8015ef5b31b7fe34
Final successor server: eight HTTP responses and focused controls 24c9a38c2a1dd668882838b565da5027c5071c7ac54182a71511d4ee7ff4f847
Swift caller and identical actor executable 67e1b8c11589bb7345b1aafa96174df005b1fb1b8194b690d9dcb33dc2c42849
Unchanged FFI signing/prerequisite library 22c302bda3f544533fb19036b231c328ab0c02d55db302b61ed409ddca4fbb8d

These are implementation-evidence identities, not wire pins or public package dependencies. The old FFI signing library is not a newly qualified v0.5 ABI evaluator. Local software execution does not establish holder generation, peer identity, real radio, source permission or withdrawal, authenticated services, protected adoption, physical/device behavior, whole-SDK parity or complete Standard conformance. All 43 obligations and unmet baselines remain in force; conformance stays none. The separately dated TypeScript 188/192/38, 46 I-JSON, 937-signature and 16-JWE results retain their own scopes and were not rerun for this documentation refresh.

Third-party adopters do not need Node/TypeScript; the fixtures are designed to be portable. You can build a conformant harness in any language and over any conformant encoding.

9) Notes on PREVIEW features

Several v0.5 capabilities are built into the draft on the editors' recommended defaults and are marked PREVIEW - under active review and revisable before the schema locks. The Base defines the candidate Tier-0 / Tier-1 surface; this source change does not establish new-version runtime interoperability or completion of its requirements. PREVIEW comes in two grades (the "two-grade PREVIEW policy" cited from Base Section 4.4): Grade-1 (structural) PREVIEW - members already on the wire (context term + shape fixtures) whose enforcement semantics remain revisable. Grade-2 (design-stage) PREVIEW - candidate members not yet in the schema/context/fixtures at all. PREVIEW surfaces include:

One boundary note that is not itself a PREVIEW surface: selective minimum disclosure is production-candidate Base behavior (Sections 1 and 2 above), claimed only in its bounded v0.5 form — projection-scoped disclosure, consent gating, sealed-entry handling, and receipt evidence. What remains open is the deeper high-privacy per-target chain: unlinkability, full or partial, cover-slot indistinguishability, resolver-operator privacy, and residual-fingerprint measurement. Do not infer those guarantees from a Base conformance claim.

A v0.5 conformance claim shows the mechanism, with reference suppliers where a supplier is needed. It shows no real-world identity, issuer or revocation result. The release boundary states the limit for first contact, issuer authority and status.

A second boundary note of the same kind: carrying an external-standard artifact (for example C2PA content-credential material, an OGC GeoPose payload, or a W3C Verifiable Credential) inside or by reference from a manifest does not extend a v0.5 conformance claim to that artifact. The carried standard verifies under its own rules, independently of the UM envelope evaluation, and a v0.5 receipt records the UM envelope outcome — not the carried standard's verdict. Absent a registered carry profile, an evaluator that cannot evaluate a carried standard preserves it (sealed/opaque or unprocessed, per the fail-closed baselines above) and does not report it as verified. A dedicated carried-standard verification-result field and an unknown-carried-standard disposition value are future registered-profile work, not Base members.

A conformance claim SHOULD state which PREVIEW features, if any, it implements, since their wire shape may still change.

10) Implementation onboarding package (non-normative)